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ABSTRACT 
There is an immense worldwide focus on microfinance as a means to abate 
poverty.  What began as small loans provided to microentrepreneurs for business 
purposes has come to include consumer loans and other financial services for the 
poor, provided in an increasingly commercial environment.  Microfinance has 
experienced rapid growth and created high expectations due to its perceived 
ability to produce economic benefits and lead to improvements in areas like 
gender relations and health and education.  Microcredit has been especially useful 
for vulnerable, self-employed individuals working in the informal economy. 
However, microfinance is not an effective tool to spur economic growth 
on a national or even regional level, and cannot live up to the hopes it has 
produced.  This thesis will look at important concerns and limitations related to 
what has become a global microfinance movement.  The analysis is influenced by 
experiences as an intern in Paraguay with Fundación Paraguaya, a development 
organization that offers group and individual microloans.     
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout modern history, attention to the goal of leveling the global 
playing field, and the means with which it may be achieved, has gone through 
profound changes.  In the League of Nation’s World Economic Surveys in 1938, 
mention of the underdeveloped world was almost entirely excluded; the report 
included only one paragraph on South America and the poor areas in Asia and 
Africa were entirely overlooked (Arndt 33).   
After World War II and the success of the Marshall Plan, people began to 
realize that the improvement of well-being for people around the world could be 
achieved through human intervention.  In the years since, development 
practitioners have been chasing what development economist William Easterly 
aptly referred to as the “elusive elixir,” or “lurking panacea”: the key to the type 
of sustainable economic and social development that will effectively eliminate 
poverty from the globe.  Today, progress towards this goal is being pursued by 
individuals, governments, philanthropists, colossal international organizations 
such as the World Bank, and tens of thousands of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). 
Despite decades of effort, very few “developing” nations made the 
transition to “developed” status in the twentieth century; most of the same groups 
that lived below the poverty line generations ago have yet to transcend that 
marker.  Currently, about 80 percent of the world’s population lives in developing 
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countries (Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work 26).  The “lurking panaceas” for 
which economists have continually searched have often been too thinly framed 
within the field of economics, based upon unproven or even disproven theory and 
ideology.  Repeatedly, the most widely implemented development strategies have 
been the result of popular economic thinking of the time, with swaths of policies 
following trends based on the same platitudes.   
Nobel laureate Amartya Sen stated that, in the field of economic 
development, “Yesterday's unexamined faith has become today's heresy, and 
yesterday's heresy is now the new superstition” (Sen 111).  Easterly quipped, 
“…just as various claims to have found the elixir of life proved groundless, we 
economists have too often peddled formulas that violated the basic principle of 
economics.”  He goes on to say that the “elusive quest for growth” remains 
elusive, and if economists’ quests to discover the means by which poor countries 
could become rich were successful, “it would be one of humankind’s great 
intellectual triumphs” (Easterly, The Elusive Quest xii, xi).  Development expert 
Jeffrey Sachs writes that, “Development economics needs an overhaul in order to 
be much more like modern medicine, a profession of rigor, insight, and 
practicality” (Sachs 74). 
For many years state-led, top-down development policies were the 
fashion, which meant large-scale industrialization and the concentration of 
economic power in the hands of a few.  These trends were often reinforced by the 
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international aid community that poured billions of dollars into numerous, and 
often dubious, large-scale development projects (Woller and Woodworth 268).  
The failure of many of these various macro-level strategies to live up to their 
promise of prosperity, due to variegated reasons, including the inefficacy of 
“trickle-down economics” and the failure of the “invisible hand,”1
After generations of disappointment, many lessons have been learned and 
mindsets have changed.  National and local policies designed and implemented 
from the bottom up are gaining ground against the top-down paradigm of the past.  
Not only have the policies to counter poverty changed, but so has the very 
definition of the problem.  A plethora of additional indicators have been 
incorporated into the definitions of poverty, broadening the concept while 
specifying its meaning.
 has led to a 
rethinking of development strategies in recent years.   
2
Led by brilliant minds like Sen, Joseph Stiglitz, and Mohammad Yunus, 
even some of the economists and institutions considered by some to be obdurate 
and tethered to dogma have made great strides refashioning traditional 
approaches.  For example, in the 1990s the United Nations (UN) partnered with 
   
                                                            
1 The term “invisible hand” was first coined by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
and was used in his other works, including “the Bible of economics,” The Wealth of Nations. It is 
a term used to describe the self-regulating nature of the marketplace, in which the forces of self-
interest, competition, and supply and demand allocate resources. This is the core principle of 
laissez-faire economics. Many criticize the way the philosophy has been used; Stiglitz has said 
“the reason that the invisible hand seems invisible is that it is not there” (Stiglitz, Making 
Globalization Work xiv). 
2 One World Bank study mentioned 33 different poverty lines developed and used by particular 
countries in addressing the needs of their poor (Yunus, Banker to the Poor 19). 
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Sen to develop the Human Development Index (HDI), which has been widely 
implemented for use as a more accurate measure of wellbeing than traditional 
indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Instead of solely relying on 
economic factors, the HDI uses a more encompassing measurement of wellbeing, 
looking at life expectancy at birth, education (literacy and school enrollment), and 
GDP per capita.3
The Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) represent the world’s most 
important commitment to improving wellbeing to date.  These goals, which are 
meant to be achieved by 2015, were officially established at the Millenium 
Summit in 2000 and agreed upon by the 192 UN member states and more than 
twenty international organizations.
 
4  The eight overall goals are: to eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote 
gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal 
health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental 
sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development (UNDP).5
                                                            
3 It should be noted that HDI has been criticized for reasons including a failure to take the political 
and civil spheres into account, not representing appropriate measures of inequality, redundancy, 
and being based upon a lack of quality data. 
   
4 A commitment of 0.7 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) was supposed to have been 
established for each developed country to enact towards achieving these goals, yet many wealthy 
nations, including the U.S., have consistently fallen far short of this figure (this 0.7 percent 
commitment for Official Development Assistance (ODA) was first made in 1970 by the UN 
General Assembly). As of 2004 the U.S. spent thirty times more on defense than on foreign 
assistance ($450 billion compared to $15 billion (Sachs 329). 
5 For a measure of how countries contribute to development, based upon seven policy indicators, 
see the Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index (CDI) 
(http://www.cgdev.org).  
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Many of the strategies promoted to achieve these goals are being enacted 
on the “micro-level.”  The most promising and attention-garnering of these 
emerging strategies, which has been credited by some experts as being an integral 
piece of the formula for achieving the MDGs, is “microfinance.”  Initially, 
microfinance was a strategy that served to mitigate capital constraints faced by 
small entrepreneurs by providing small loans for business purposes, frequently in 
amounts of less than $100.  Often, additional services helpful to the poor, such as 
business training or health and education programs, are offered alongside 
financial services.  While microfinance once referred only to these small 
“microloans” meant for entrepreneurs, in recent years microfinance has come to 
include a wide range of financial services offered on a “micro” scale, mainly to 
poor people who have historically been excluded from financial services.  These 
include services such as business or consumer credit, savings, wire transfers 
(including for remittances), and insurance. 
  Rather than “trickling down” from the top through government policy or 
big business, microfinance has traditionally been carried out on a local level by 
NGOs, with the goal being to put the keys to economic empowerment in the 
hands of individuals.  Microfinance has been a direct response to the failed top-
down policies of the past, and some see it as shifting development responsibility 
from the public to the private sector.  The popularity of microfinance is in part 
attributable to the fact that it appeals to those on all sides of the political spectrum.  
It falls within the scope of some left-leaning ideals because it targets the poor and 
6 
 
provides a perceptible amount of poverty alleviation through self-help, and until 
recently, did so without the influx of big business (especially in comparison with 
platforms like foreign direct investment (FDI)).  Microfinance appeals to the right 
because it is associated with enabling entrepreneurship and business development 
so the poor can provide for themselves, without state intervention and handouts.  
More importantly, the concept of microfinance is meant to supersede years of 
frequently ineffective foreign aid.6
With a few exceptions, most development initiatives have overlooked the 
fact that poor individuals have lacked access to even the most basic financial 
services such as credit and savings.
  In effect, microfinance is seen as a sustainable 
tool for improving lives, and not just another handout.   
7  This is evidenced by the fact that, as of 
2005, fewer than 18 percent of the world’s poorest households had access to 
financial services (Meehan 2).8  In Latin America, the vast majority of households 
lack access to formal credit or savings services, especially in rural areas, and even 
in relatively developed metropolitan areas.9
                                                            
6 The West has spent $2.3 trillion on foreign aid in the last fifty years (Easterly, The White Man's 
Burden 4). 
  In 2004 the Consultative Group to 
7 Multiple government programs have provided credit to farmers, but most resulted in failure. The 
lack of success is sometimes attributed to the fact that, since the funds were distributed by the 
government, people treated it like an allowance and not a loan to be repaid.  
8 In the developing world, there have been multiple reasons that access to credit has not been more 
widespread, and lack of demand usually is not cited as one of them. The impecunious have 
historically turned to family members, moneylenders (loan sharks), or other informal lenders for 
access to credit. These lenders are usually not regulated, which means penalties for non-repayment 
can sometimes include threats of violence, and exorbitant interest rates well over 100 percent can 
be the norm. 
9 Eighty percent of households in Mexico City and 60 percent of households in urban Brazil are 
“financially excluded.” Only about 13 percent of families in the U.S. and 7 percent in the U.K. 
lack bank accounts (Fay and Laderchi 209). 
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Assist the Poor (CGAP) estimated that, with a market supply in the $4 billion 
range, less than 5 percent of the total demand for microfinance was being met 
(Meehan 1).10
In Sen’s system of instrumental freedoms, availability and access to 
finance are core economic facilities (Sen 39).  Likewise, access to credit is part of 
John Rawls’ global justice framework (Rawls 42).  Milton Friedman has been 
quoted as saying that “The poor stay poor not because they are lazy, but because 
they have no access to capital” (Kiplinger 62).  Adam Smith’s words from The 
Wealth of Nations, which is considered to be the founding work upon which the 
modern field of economics is based, sums up the philosophy behind microcredit: 
“Money, says the proverb, makes money.  When you have got a little, it is often 
easy to get more.  The great difficulty is to get that little.” 
  In 2009, after tremendous growth, experts were putting this figure 
at about 10 percent (Hechler-Fayd'herbe 2). 
In addition to increases in household income and consumption, 
microfinance proponents have claimed that microfinance leads to a myriad of 
social and economic benefits, including enhancing business profits, nutrition, 
schooling, contraception, and a variety of measures of empowerment and changes 
in social consciousness, especially for women (Armendáriz and Morduch 200).  
Microcredit has even been used to counter human sex trafficking (Getu).  
According to the 2006 Microcredit Summit Campaign Report, microfinance can 
                                                            
10 It should be noted that these types of figures are widely contested. It is often assumed there is an 
effective demand in areas where no supply exists. Some observers argue that in certain areas, no 
supply exists because there is no demand (Dichter et al.). 
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produce a quadruple bottom line: relieving suffering, bringing dignity, becoming 
sustainable and inspiring supporters (Daley-Harris np).     
In the past decade and a half, “microfinance,” tied in with other buzzwords 
like “grassroots,” “microenterprise,” “barefoot banking,” and “self-
empowerment,” has quickly become the newest craze in development thinking.  
Its popularity comes in part because of its perceived sustainability and the fact 
that it represents a stark contrast to many of the traditional macroeconomic 
policies that rely on aid or economic doctrine to achieve their putative goal of 
helping the poor.  With the explosive growth of what has become a global 
movement, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have multiplied rapidly and now 
operate in every major region of the world, from the most remote villages of 
Africa to the inner-cities of the United States.   
Between December 1997 and December 2005, the number of MFIs 
reporting to the Microcredit Summit increased from 618 to 3,133,11
                                                            
11 The definition of an MFI can vary. CGAP estimates there are as many as 10,000 MFIs 
worldwide (though just 150-200 are estimated to be serving the vast majority of clients) 
(Callaghan, Gonzalez, Maurice, and Novak 117). 
 while the 
number of people who received credit from these institutions rose from 13.5 to 
113.3 million in the same short period (Daley-Harris np).  In 2009 CGAP 
estimated that the microfinance industry had grown to the range of about $30 
billion, and expanded lending at an extraordinary pace of 40 to 50 percent 
annually from 2004 to 2009 (Copeland A12).  Between 2004 and 2007, foreign 
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investment in MFIs in developing countries more than quadrupled to reach a total 
of US$5.7 billion.  There are now more than 100 investment funds specializing in 
microfinance, at least 53 of which have been established only since 2005 (PR 
Newswire np).  These funds returned 4.47 percent in the twelve months leading 
up to August of 2009, compared to a 22 percent loss by Standard & Poor’s 500-
stock index (Copeland A12).   
The surge of attention microfinance is receiving has come from both the 
public and private sectors.  There has certainly been an efflorescence of academic 
literature devoted to microfinance, in addition to targeted interest from other 
increasingly diverse areas.  In January of 1997 the UN created a plan to make 
$21.6 billion available to 100 million of the world’s poor through microfinance 
programs, and later declared 2005 to be the International Year of Microcredit 
(Egli 505).12
The year 2006 brought microfinance the greatest attention to date when 
the Nobel Prize was awarded to the most famous pioneers of the microfinance 
movement, Mohammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank.  Since then, Yunus has 
been awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Barack Obama and was 
named one of BusinessWeek’s Thirty Greatest Entrepreneurs of All-time.
   
13
                                                            
12 The International Year of Microcredit was co-sponsored by Citicorp. 
  He 
has also been featured on the popular television series The Simpsons, and even 
has a major motion picture of his life slated for production in 2010.  Wealthy 
13 Businessweek titled Yunus’ article “Nobel Winner Yunus: Microcredit Missionary” (Gangemi). 
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philanthropists such as George Soros, eBay co-founder Pierre Omidyar, and 
foundations run by Bill Clinton and Bill and Melinda Gates have pledged 
hundreds of millions of dollars to microfinance.  Further support comes from 
activist celebrities, just a few of which include Natalie Portman, Michael Douglas, 
Robert Duvall, and Yeardley Smith (the voice of Lisa from The Simpsons). 
This phenomenal growth and enormous surge in attention certainly 
warrants close scrutiny, as it is apparent that development practitioners are caught 
up in this latest trend, just as in the past.  As pointed out by one of the more 
outspoken skeptics of microfinance, Thomas Dichter, 55,000 staff days and $30 
million were spent on 120 microfinance conferences in 2005, many of them in 
celebration of microfinance as an accepted idea and an accomplished set of 
practices.  Dichter stated that “Despite the fact that there continues to be some 
lively debates within the field, it is undeniable that a degree of self-satisfaction 
has set in” (Dichter and Harper, What's Wrong with Microfinance? 5). 
Currently, the microfinance movement stands at a crossroads, and 2009 
may turn out to be a “pivotal year” in regards to clearing up what the actual 
effects of microfinance really are (Roodman np).  In addition to phenomenally 
rapid growth, the movement is experiencing a sea change.  Microfinance services 
are increasingly being offered by commercial banks, and increasingly on a 
consumer level, not necessarily as a tool for the poor to use for productive 
business services as originally intended.  Furthermore, attention recently has been 
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drawn to the very likely possibility that perhaps the majority of the microloans 
that have been offered by MFIs, for business purposes, have actually gone 
towards household expenses.  Moreover, the overwhelmingly positive claims of 
the past are beginning to be reconsidered, and some development practitioners 
have even suggested that microfinance could constrain development.  
In order to understand these critiques and to grasp the utility of 
microfinance, it is necessary to understand the climate from which it has emerged.  
Through the aftermath of population-encompassing macroeconomic disasters and 
the neoliberal responses that sustained and sometimes generated increases in 
informal employment, microfinance has surfaced as the most appropriate response 
in the resulting economic epoch.  The proliferation of microenterprise, fueled by 
microcredit, has resulted not from a lucrative potential for economic growth, but 
from the fact that, for the poor and unskilled, few options outside of self-
employment exist.   
This paper will demonstrate that, in spite of all the excitement and praise 
associated with microfinance, and the fact that financial services can sometimes 
improve the lives of the poor, in reality, microfinance and the self-employment it 
encourages possess little potential for generating the type of macroeconomic 
growth that can lift populations above the poverty line.  Essentially, microfinance 
has been a neoliberal response to a neoliberal problem.  Shifting labor patterns 
and reductions in meaningful employment have resulted in people being forced 
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into entrepreneurship, especially within the informal economy, which leaves them 
vulnerable.  A significant portion of the world’s self-employed supported by 
microcredit work in the informal economy, which poses a unique set of problems 
that need to be addressed.  Though microcredit and other financial services 
offered by MFIs certainly treat some of the symptoms of poverty, microfinance 
alone will not eliminate poverty, and cannot live up to the promises being 
attached to it within such a celebratory environment.   
To give the poor a chance to improve their lives, much more than financial 
services are needed.  Microfinance must be carefully positioned within the puzzle 
for progress; the hype that microfinance has produced cannot be allowed to 
siphon funds and attention from other, perhaps more important government-
financed development projects in areas like health, education, and infrastructure.  
While anecdotes and studies have shown that indeed, impressive gains can be 
made as a direct result of microfinance, it makes up only a partial contribution to 
a formula for solving the problems faced by the poor.  As acknowledged by 
Yunus: “Poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon.  It is about people’s lives 
and their livelihoods.  To free people from poverty, all aspects of their lives need 
to be addressed, from the personal level to the global level and from the economic 
dimensions to the political, social, technological, and psychological dimensions.  
These are not separate and disconnected elements but closely intertwined” 
(Yunus, Creating a World Without Poverty 75). 
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Sen explained that development can be seen as a “process of expanding 
the real freedoms that people enjoy.”  His views, worthy of a Nobel Prize, 
illustrate that social, cultural, and political freedoms are themselves desirable, and 
also contribute to individual income growth.  The productivity and employability 
of the poor can be enhanced with services such as public safety, basic education, 
public health, and infrastructure.  While access to financial services is one of the 
freedoms outlined by Sen’s works, it is only one piece of a much larger 
equation.14
Importantly, opportunities for improvements in the lives of the poor 
should not be left largely to market forces, with the chances for success strongly 
resting on the potential of microfinance-funded entrepreneurship, as often seems 
to be the case.  While previous development strategies modeled on the top-down 
paradigm have not always succeeded in eliminating poverty, a wholesale transfer 
of development efforts into the private sector is not the answer.   A decision of 
how to arrange microfinance within the wider scheme of development also must 
not be left to the market, as increasingly appears to be the case as microfinance 
becomes more driven by commercial interests. 
 
                                                            
14 Economic theory and empirical evidence demonstrate that economic returns are higher when the 
proper infrastructure and institutions are in place. For example, if a country has poor roads that 
slow transportation, profits will be diminished throughout the economy, or high shipping expenses 
will be passed on to the consumer. Similarly, if an area has poor health facilities, productivity will 
suffer because people will get sick more often and for longer periods of time. Power outages are 
another problem common in developing countries, costing millions every year in lost productivity. 
The rate of return to infrastructure projects such as irrigation and drainage, telecommunications, 
airports, highways, seaports, railways, electric power, water supply, sanitation, and sewage 
averages from 16 to 18 percent per year. Likewise, the returns to maintenance spending on 
existing infrastructure, such as roads, are perhaps as much as 70 percent (Easterly 234).   
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This paper will attempt to put microfinance into perspective, highlighting 
its limitations in an effort to avoid overly optimistic expectations about its true 
potential.  The goal is not to discount microfinance as a strategy to alleviate 
poverty and sow the seeds of progress, but to bring to light its drawbacks and its 
limitations.  Microfinance is not a panacea and cannot replace other forms of 
development assistance.  It can be a useful tool to tackle poverty, but it is only one 
of many, and must be combined with other measures in order to be effective.  
Most would agree that traditional approaches to development have failed, and 
some have offered microfinance as the solution to these failures.  However, its 
actual effectiveness, as a substitute or even a complement to traditional 
development schemes, can be questioned, as this paper will demonstrate.   
Microfinance should not be seen as a substitute to government 
intervention.  It will not lead to significant improvement in the type of 
macroeconomic indicators that economists rely on, such as GDP.  Microfinance is 
more about improving quality of life on an individual level.  When it is 
successful, it brings about an improvement in the freedoms people enjoy.  The 
author’s hope is that the phenomenal acceleration and widespread euphoria 
surrounding the movement does not diminish the potential for well-devised 
microfinance initiatives, in addition to other effective strategies to eliminate 
poverty.  In order to ensure this, a more thorough understanding of both the full 
potential and substantial limitations of microfinance is needed.   
15 
 
 (ECLAC 11) 
 
A Paraguayan context 
Many of the ideas presented in this thesis are derived from two months 
spent in Paraguay working as an intern at the country’s largest NGO, Fundación 
Paraguaya (FP), a well-respected, non-profit organization that provides 
microfinance and various social services to those in need.15
                                                            
15 FP was the first NGO of its kind in Paraguay. The organization has received numerous 
recognitions, including the IDB Award for Excellence in Social Entrepreneurship, the Schwab 
Foundation Award, and an Honorable Mention from CGAP for financial transparency. FP is 
  FP operates out of 
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seventeen regional offices serving 136 towns and cities throughout the country 
(www.fundacionparaguaya.org.py).  In these two months, I had daily interactions 
with microentrepreneurs, credit officials, and other MFI employees in diverse 
urban and rural settings.  Most of the time was spent working on projects at one of 
the more financially successful branch offices in San Lorenzo, an area right 
outside of the capital city, Asunción.  Additional time was spent in the main office 
in Asunción and on a trip across the countryside with the director of the rural 
microfinance program.    
  Fundación Paraguaya de Cooperación y Desarrollo (Paraguayan 
Foundation for Cooperation and Development) was founded in 1985 by a group 
of national business leaders, including Executive Director Martin Burt, out of 
frustration with the “then-dictatorship’s inability to tackle problems of severe 
poverty, and its lack of support for those wishing to work their way out of it.”  
Originally, the idea was to improve the business skills of microentrepreneurs, but 
when it became obvious that a lack of credit, rather than skills, was limiting their 
growth, a partnership with ACCION International was established to begin to 
offer microfinance services (www.fundacionparaguaya.org.py). 
The objective of FP’s microfinance programs are to “promote the 
development of micro and small enterprises along with people of scarce means 
through the creation, expansion, and strengthening of sustainable lending, training 
                                                                                                                                                                  
included as a Champion in the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX)’s “League of 
Champions” for standing out in terms of results and transparency. In 2005 FP was distinguished as 
the sixth most profitable MFI in Latin America (Fundación Paraguaya, Awards Received). 
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and advisory services.”  The foundation has provided technical assistance, 
management training and loans to more than 36,000 microentrepreneurs in over 
90 different types of urban and rural microenterprises, including small grocery 
stores, street vendors, taxis, homemade food producers, garment makers, artisans, 
blacksmiths, and farmers, among others.  FP claims that statistics supported by 
independent research suggest that approximately 23,000 jobs have been created, 
at a ratio of 1.3 job per microenterprise supported for over one year 
(www.fundacionparaguaya.org.py).  According to ACCION, a global 
microfinance network, most FP loan recipients work in the commercial sector; 28 
percent own small stores and 18 percent work in the food industry.  Fifty percent 
of the microenterprises have between two and four employees and 46 percent 
have just one employee (Acción, Where We Work: Fundación Paraguaya).     
FP offers several credit products, ranging from $40 for the small 
entrepreneur to $15,000 for commercial and industrial ventures.  Loans are 
usually targeted towards small microentrepreneurs, especially in the informal 
sector; the average loan is less than $450, which is $150 less than the average loan 
offered by competitors (www.fundacionparaguaya.org.py).  Training and other 
services also are provided, as the foundation prides itself on being a development 
entity more than a financial entity.  The MFI program goals are to: increase 
family income, strengthen precarious jobs, promote job creation, improve gender 
equity, and promote entrepreneurship (www.fundacionparaguaya.org.py).   
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The organization aims to be entirely financially independent, and in the 
case of individual microlending, achieves this goal.  Surpluses generated through 
individual microlending operations are funneled into other FP programs meant to 
create synergies with one another, such as lending to women’s groups (Women 
Entrepreneurs Committee, or Comite de Mujeres (CME), established in 2005), 
rural microlending (established in 2001 with the support of the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB)), entrepreneurial training for the young (Junior 
Achievement, etc.), the world’s first (ostensibly) self-sufficient rural agricultural 
school (San Francisco Agricultural School), and other services important in a 
developing country. 
 
Fundación Paraguaya Program Growth: 
Year Active Portfolio 
Amount 
Disbursed 
Active 
Clients 
Average 
Loan 
Balance 
2002 $2,000,000 $3,868,000 6,015 $333 
2003 $2,440,000 $3,758,000 7,076 $345 
2004 $2,736,934 $5,254,921 6,529 $419 
2005 $4,196,464 $7,416,353 9,259 $453 
2006 $6,003,000 $10,679,000 19,473 $308 
2007 $9,100,000 $14,400,000 24,896 $367 
2008 $11,309,000 $25,161,000 34,222 $330 
(Acción) 
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Of the countries in Latin America, Paraguay is an exceptional area to 
study microfinance.  Its low measures of human and economic development put it 
behind all but a few countries in Latin America, while its informal economy and 
high levels of corruption draw parallels with underdeveloped countries in poor 
parts of Asia and Africa, many of which are faced with far greater poverty 
concerns than most of Latin America.  Furthermore, the high levels of self-
employment in the informal economy make it a country that should, in theory, be 
especially responsive to the gains that can be realized through microfinance.   
Estimates suggest that between one-third (World Bank Poverty 
Assessment) to one-half (2003 Census Bureau Household Survey) of the 
population of Paraguay is poor.  In rural areas, 41.2 percent of the population 
lacks a monthly income to cover basic necessities, while in urban areas this figure 
is 27.6 percent.  Nationally, the top 10 percent of the population possesses 43.8 
percent of the national income, while the lowest 10 percent has just 0.5 percent.  
Furthermore, land concentration in Paraguay is among the highest in the world.  
Just 10 percent of the population controls two-thirds of the land, while 30 percent 
of the rural population is landless (Carter, Gacitúa Marió and Silva-Leander vi) 
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Several key observations planted the seeds for this research: 
1. Many, if not most microloans are used to “sobrevivir,” or to survive, 
by bridging gaps in income and running small enterprises on a 
subsistence level.  Rarely do loans enable borrowers to significantly 
expand their businesses, hire workers, and achieve prosperity.  Widely 
publicized stories of microentrepreneurs who have been able to make 
substantial improvements in their lives using microloans appear to be 
the exception, rather than the rule. 
2. Of FP’s clients in the individual lending program, the majority of those 
in the middle class are there because they began there, not because a 
microloan propelled them there.  For an individual to receive a 
microloan for business, an enterprise must have already been 
established. 
3. Few options aside from informal self-employment exist in Paraguay, 
especially for the unskilled with low educational attainment.  The easy 
entry, especially when enabled by microfinance, makes self-
employment a relatively attractive option. 
4. A substantial portion of Paraguay’s microentrepreneurs operate 
identical microenterprises, competing in highly competitive markets 
with low returns, unable to reach economies of scale. 
5. The tools for microentrepreneurial success are not in place in 
Paraguay.  Regulatory reforms in multiple areas need to be enacted, 
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which, among other things, should provide more of an incentive for 
regulation and make it a less prohibitive option for microenterprises.  
These reforms must accompany significant improvements in the legal 
system.  Legal and regulatory improvements would greatly enhance 
the potential for microfinance to play a part in Paraguay’s 
development. 
6. Substantial, well-planned government intervention is necessary for 
Paraguay’s economic and social development.  Corruption must be 
greatly reduced for this to happen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paraguay 
• Population of 6.2 million 
• 101st in HDI 
• 14.2% of the population lives below $2 per day 
• 6.5% of the population lives below $1.25 per day 
• Adult literacy is 93.5% for females and 95.7% for males 
• GDP per capita is $1,997 
• GDP per capita growth rate of -0.3% from 1990-2007 
• Combined gross enrollment ratio in education is 72.2% for 
females and 72.1% for males 
• 82nd in Gender-related development index (GDI) 
(UN Human Development Report 2009) 
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 (ECLAC 15) 
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A HISTORY OF MICROFINANCE 
Introduction 
To effectively analyze the potential of microfinance, and the euphoria that 
surrounds it, it is necessary to be cognizant of the historical trends of economic 
development.  In spite of all the hoopla surrounding microfinance, putting the 
strategy into historical context should rein in a good deal of the optimism 
associated with the movement.  In the past, too much reliance on a promising, 
singular solution has repeatedly failed.  In an effort to learn from and avoid 
repeating the mistakes of the past, it is necessary to recognize that microfinance is 
not a silver bullet for poverty, but only a small, yet integral, part of an equation 
that can abate it.  It should be looked at through a historical lens of limited 
progress, marked with years of failure.  Careful scrutiny must accompany the 
movement in order for it to continue to effectively combat poverty and have the 
greatest possible impact.   
Development studies and development economics designed to lift poor 
countries and their inhabitants out of poverty date back to the post World War II 
era.  At that time, it was demonstrated that, through human intervention, lives 
could be improved on a significant scale.  The success of the Marshall Plan in 
Europe led to the implementation of similar interventions of wide-ranging scope 
across the developing world, in spite of the fact that many of these countries were 
not rebuilding, but developing for the first time.  The end of the colonial era, in 
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tandem with long lasting attempts to thwart the spread of communism, especially 
brought the importance of development to the forefront in the eyes of 
policymakers.  Throughout the 1950s to the early 1970s, development initiatives 
mostly took place from the top-down, with continuous focus placed on industrial 
development as a way to catch up with the West through replication and imitation.  
This era was marked by the public ordering of the economy, as popular 
belief held that it was the government’s job to guide development.  This led to 
economies being planned by the state, and the close regulation of the private 
sector.  Throughout the developing world during this era, state enterprises 
flourished.  In Latin America, import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies 
were the vanguard, and government enterprises were seen as the fundamental 
engines of development.  This era was characterized by closed economies and 
economic self-reliance, manifested in high tariffs, restrictions on foreign 
investment, and tight controls over foreign exchange (Dañino, Genta-Fons and 
Salacuse 441-442). 
During this time, the developed world’s attempts to facilitate economic 
growth in the Third World, as it was then known, consisted mainly of aid.16
                                                            
16 Of the $30.4 billion spent on foreign aid between 1948 and the mid-1950s, 77 percent went to 
U.S. suppliers (Dichter, Despite Good Intentions 57). 
  This 
early and long-lasting (until today) strategy emerged after World War II, based on 
the empirical success of the rebuilding of Europe and the idea that aid-financed 
investment in dams, roads, and machines would yield growth (Easterly, The 
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Elusive Quest).17  Economists at the time relied on models based on popular 
economic thinking of the era.18
In Latin America throughout the 1960s and 1970s, many countries, 
especially the larger economies such as Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, followed 
the economic mindset of the time by borrowing heavily from international 
creditors for economic development in the form of industrialization.  The 
countries had quickly growing economies at the time, so credit was widely 
available for these industrialization efforts, which consisted mainly of 
infrastructural programs.  Multiple figures indicate that from 1950 to 1983, the 
region’s external debt quadrupled, culminating in an amount of about 50 percent 
of the region’s GDP.  Just between 1970 and 1980, Latin America’s foreign debt 
  “The method of argumentation was virtually 
always the same.  The subject was material well-being, indicated by measurable 
income per capita.  The conceptual tools were taken overwhelmingly from 
economic science…the logic was applied “universally” across the spectrum of 
“developing countries,” with little allowance or variation for their evident 
differences in size, history, cultures, natural endowments, etc.” (Bangasser 2-3). 
                                                            
17 Theoretically, this strategy was largely based on an article on economic growth published by 
Evsey Domar in April 1946 titled “Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment.” 
Domar’s growth model became, and continues to be today, the most widely applied growth model 
in economic history. As Easterly pointed out, it continues to be applied to this day to poor 
countries in order to determine a “required” investment rate for a target growth rate, even though 
the model was not intended as a growth model, made no sense as a growth model, and was 
disavowed by Domar himself back in 1957. Easterly noted that Domar’s approach became popular 
because it had a conveniently simple prediction: GDP growth will be proportional to the share of 
investment spending in GDP (Easterly, The Elusive Quest 28-29). 
18 This included theory based on economic literature such as Raul Prebisch’s “center vs. 
periphery” (1949), Arthur Lewis’ “unlimited supplies of labour” (1954), Harvey Leibenstein’s 
“big push” (1957), and W. W. Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth (1960), which went 
through thirteen printings between March 1960 and November 1965 (Bangasser 2-3). 
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doubled (Ugarteche 201).  Simultaneously, debt service of interest and the 
repayment of principal grew at an extremely rapid pace. 
With rapidly rising oil prices in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the 
triggering of a global recession, the massive accumulation of Latin American debt 
could not be easily repaid.  This was brought to light in August of 1982 when 
Mexico’s Finance Minister declared that Mexico would no longer be able to 
service its debt in a timely manner.  As a consequence, most commercial banks 
either drastically reduced or stopped lending to Latin America.   
Due to the fact that many of the loans were short-term, a crisis followed 
when their refinancing was not accepted.  Billions of dollars of loans became due 
immediately, triggering widespread and long-lasting financial calamity in the 
region.  Between 1980 and 1990, economic growth in Latin America stagnated 
and the region exported $375 billion for debt servicing, despite which the debt 
doubled again due to compounding interest (Ugarteche 201).  These results, 
which rippled throughout the whole of the region and the world, led to the 1980s 
being referred to as “The Lost Decade” for Latin America.     
By 1980, development strategies had begun to take a considerable turn.  
The World Bank, who has always been a trendsetter and the most important 
player in the field of development, began imposing conditions on economic 
policies to countries in crisis, rather than just conditions on particular projects, as 
they had in the past.  This structural adjustment lending, as it was called, was 
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meant to induce loan recipients to adjust their macroeconomic policies to promote 
growth, while providing needed money in the absence of commercial lending 
(Easterly, The Elusive Quest 102).  Many observers see this as the Bank 
abandoning its role as a development bank and becoming a policy-making 
institution that intervenes in the internal affairs of countries.  The IMF had always 
attached conditions to its loans, and after 1982 began to expand the number and 
lengthen the maturity of loans.  Aid donors and official creditors also began to 
make their grants and loans more conditional by coordinating their lending with 
the IMF and the World Bank (Easterly, The Elusive Quest 102).  By the mid-
1980s, the models that had led to the debt crisis were being abandoned 
worldwide, replaced by a “new superstition.”19
Across the region, planners and government officials, influenced (or by 
some observations, coerced) by the IMF and World Bank, shifted almost 
wholesale to what is typically called the “neoliberal” era.  The market-based 
paradigm of the neoliberal model was essentially what the previous state-led 
model was not; it abandoned strict planning and left it to the invisible hand of the 
   
                                                            
19 Stiglitz wrote that, when he moved from the domestic into the international arena, he found that, 
especially at the IMF, “Decisions were on the basis of what seemed a curious blend of ideology 
and bad economics, dogma that sometimes seemed to be thinly veiling special interests. When 
crises hit, the IMF prescribed outmoded, inappropriate, if “standard” solutions, without 
considering the effects they would have on the people in the countries told to follow these policies. 
Rarely did I see forecasts about what the policies would do to poverty. Rarely did I see thoughtful 
discussions and analyses of the consequences of alternative policies. There was a single 
prescription. Alternative opinions were not sought. Open, frank discussion was discouraged—
there was no room for it. Ideology guided policy prescriptions and countries were expected to 
follow the IMF guidelines without debate” (Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents xiii-xiv). 
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market to allocate resources, particularly credit and foreign exchange, and spur 
development.  This meant an abrupt shift from closed to open economies, 
including an overall strategy of deregulation, which meant a reduction of trade 
barriers and reduction in the size of government, the privatization of state-owned 
industries, and lifting restrictions on the movement of capital.  Together these 
strategies made up the prescriptions known as the Washington Consensus or 
neoliberal or free market reforms.  The planning and persuasion for these reforms, 
which ostensibly are meant to stabilize economies and encourage growth, have 
been formulated especially by actors in developed economies.  Most often, 
neoliberalism has been a disaster for the world’s poor.   
 
Tracing the roots of microfinance 
The beginnings of microfinance, in the form of both formal and informal 
financial services for the poor, can be traced back quite some time throughout the 
world.  Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) existed in China 1,500 
years ago (Peace Corps 46).  As early as the 1300s, forms of microfinance and 
collective lending existed in the susus of Ghana, chit funds in India, tandas in 
Mexico, arisan in Indonesia, and tontines in west Africa (Hartford np).  In 
Europe, as early as the 15th century, Franciscan monks in Perugia, Italy would 
lend money to the poor in times of crisis, and as collateral would hold some 
precious items to cover their operating costs.  This idea, reminiscent of modern 
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pawnshops and referred to as a “Fund of Mercy,” was endorsed by the Pope and 
spread widely (Hartford np).   
Additionally, the Irish Loan Fund System was launched in the early 1700s 
to provide small loans to poor farmers with no collateral, and at its peak was 
lending to 20 percent of all Irish households every year (Helms 2-3).  Later on, in 
1865, Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen developed the concept of the credit union, 
which expanded across several regions of the world beginning in 1870 (Hartford 
np).  Many modern financial cooperatives in Africa, Latin America, and Asia 
trace their roots to European movements such as these.  Another early example of 
microfinance in Asia is the Indonesian People’s Credit Banks, which was opened 
in 1895 and with close to 9,000 branches today, has become the largest 
microfinance system in Indonesia (Helms 3). 
Access to credit has historically not been available to, and even explicitly 
restricted from the masses for various reasons.  In Europe, the Christian Church’s 
dogmatic conventions upon usury forbade Christians from lending money out at 
interest.  In that part of the world, Jewish bankers stepped in to fulfill the demand 
for credit, and though ostracized, profited greatly from lending.  Over time, with 
the evolution of the Medici Bank in the 15th century and breakthroughs in finance 
(such as government bonds to fund war), moral restrictions against certain forms 
of finance faded and charging interest on loans became more widely accepted. 
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Modern overview 
“Microfinance” had usually been called “microcredit” until the early 
1990s because it traditionally entailed only small loans made to the poor.  As the 
range of services provided has increased to include insurance, money transfers, 
savings, and more, the term “microfinance” has been used to encompass this 
range of small-scale financial services.  Many other terms are used, often 
interchangeably, with the word microfinance. These include barefoot banking, 
microlending, microbanking, and microloans, among others (Helms 3).  
In the modern world, there are several principal reasons the scope and 
number of institutions providing needed financial services such as credit, savings, 
and insurance to the poor have been limited.  The following stylized facts, as 
outlined by Jansson and Taborga and Woller and Warner, have left the majority of 
the world’s poor starved for the credit necessary to open or expand businesses or 
utilize other financial services that can lead to improvements in well-being: 
• Banks face relatively high transaction costs when working in poor 
communities because handling many small transactions is far more 
expensive than servicing fewer, larger transactions.   
• Microloans are often repaid in weekly or biweekly installments, 
which make operating expenses high.  (Operating expenses 
(relative to assets) of specialized MFIs are generally at least 60 
percent higher than for commercial banks) (Jansson and Taborga). 
• The poor typically do not possess collateral. 
• There is a lack of information in poor communities, which makes 
risk assessment especially difficult.  The costs involved with 
screening and monitoring the activities of the poor and enforcing 
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their contracts are often seen as too high to make lending to them 
profitable. 
• The poor have not typically been considered likely entrepreneurial 
candidates. 
• Many of the world’s poor work in the informal economy (Woller 
and Woodworth 271). 
 
Regarding insurance, savings, and consumer credit, there are wide 
differences between countries and regions in which types of services are offered.  
Medium income countries such as Mexico or Brazil are more inclined to offer 
consumer credit and savings, while MFIs in poorer countries tend to focus on 
credit to stimulate entrepreneurship.  In the last several years, some MFIs, 
especially those driven by profit, have begun to place more emphasis on 
consumer loans, in both high and low income countries.20
 
 
The microfinance movement 
In contemporary times there is one microfinance narrative that stands out 
above all.  The story of Yunus and the founding of the Grameen Bank have been 
disseminated through academic texts, mainstream news outlets, and Yunus’ 
autobiographical New York Times bestselling book, Banker to the Poor: Micro-
                                                            
20 Banking sector outreach varies significantly across countries. In Ethiopia there is less than one 
branch per 100,000 people, while in Spain there are 96. In Albania, there are four loans per 1,000 
people and the average loan size is fifteen times GDP per capita, while in Poland there are 774 
loans per 1,000 people and the average size of loans is only one-third of GDP per capita (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, Reaching Out 2).  
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Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty,21 which was followed by Creating 
a World Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism.  What is 
perhaps the most fabled story in the field of contemporary development began 
when Yunus, a Bangladeshi economist educated at Vanderbilt University, began 
experimenting with small loans to impoverished villagers in Bangladesh in 1976.  
He first lent $27 out of his pocket, which the recipients used to run simple 
business activities such as rice husking and bamboo weaving.22
After some initial success, Yunus eventually convinced the central bank of 
Bangladesh to help him set up a special branch to cater to the poor in the town of 
Jobra.  The project soon flourished, assisted with funding provided by the 
International Fund for Agriculture and Development, the Ford Foundation, and 
the governments of Bangladesh, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands.  The 
Grameen Bank grew to include over one million members in 1991 (Armendáriz 
and Morduch 2, 11-12) and seven million by 2006 (Yunus, Creating a World 
   
                                                            
21 Yunus’ Banker to the Poor spent ten weeks on the New York Times bestseller list. 
22 Though Grameen Bank was one of the earlier MFIs, organizations such as Acción International, 
founded by Joseph Blatchford in Venezuela, actually predated Yunus by a few years (1973). Other 
early pioneers included Al Whittaker and David Bussau, who began lending to microentrepreneurs 
in Indonesia and Colombia in 1971 (Hartford np). Another pioneer is Projeto Uno in Recife, 
Brazil, which offered small loans to microenterprises beginning in 1972. This MFI introduced the 
concept of young, proactive loan officers who developed personal relationships with the clients 
and were responsible for all aspects of the loan cycle, from start to finish (Berger, The Latin 
American Model of Microfinance 9). FINCA, another prominent Latin American MFI that has 
spread throughout 21 countries, is credited with pioneering the village banking model. It was 
launched in 1984 by John Hatch, a former Peace Corps volunteer and Fulbright-trained economist. 
FINCA started as a program in Bolivia that provided credit to farmers without collateral, and in 
1986 began to provide loans to women involved in commerce and petty trade in El Salvador 
(FINCA, Narrative History). 
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Without Poverty 51-52).  In Bangladesh, 80 percent of poor families have been 
reached with microcredit (Yunus, Banker to the Poor 66).23
It is important to be aware of the Grameen story when assessing the state 
of microfinance today, as Grameen truly envelopes the social philosophy upon 
which microfinance was originally based, and is often the measure against which 
other MFIs are compared.  The accomplishments of the foundation are 
phenomenal, especially considering its humble origins and the numerous political 
complications and devastating environmental disasters it has survived.  Due to its 
success in reaching poverty-stricken populations, Grameen’s platform has been 
replicated throughout the world, including the U.S., and today the bank is widely 
considered to be one the world’s most successful institutions that works with the 
poor.
       
24
The Bank’s success largely has to do with the founder’s philosophy and 
vision.  Yunus grew up in Bangladesh and has always maintained a close 
relationship with the poor.  As a Bangladeshi, he has witnessed the failures of 
development initiatives firsthand, and therefore has evolved a sound 
  Grameen has also launched Grameen Foundation, an organization that 
works throughout the world to tackle poverty, using various types of unique 
initiatives outside the realm of microfinance.  
                                                            
23 In 2006 Grameen Bank earned a profit of $20 million and distributed dividends for the first 
time, to borrowers who were considered shareholders of the bank (previous government-imposed 
restrictions had been lifted). Yunus claims a repayment rate of 98.6 percent, and that 64 percent of 
the borrowers that have been with the bank for more than five years have surmounted the poverty 
line (Yunus, Creating a World Without Poverty 51-52). 
24 While Yunus claims 100 percent sustainability, it took Grameen years of substantial funding 
from outside actors to reach this point, and the bank pays no corporate tax. 
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understanding of what it takes to make a difference in the lives of the poor.  In 
Banker to the Poor, he explains that  
…wherever a poverty alleviation program allowed the nonpoor to be co-
passengers, the poor would soon be elbowed out of the program by those 
who were better off.  In the world of development, if one mixes the poor 
and the nonpoor in a program, the nonpoor will always drive out the poor, 
and the less poor will drive out the more poor, unless protective measures 
are instituted right at the beginning.  In such cases, the nonpoor reap 
benefits of all that is done in the name of the poor...The poor know that 
this credit is their only opportunity to break out of poverty.  They do not 
have any cushion whatsoever to fall back on.  If they fall afoul of this one 
loan, they will have lost their one and only chance to get out of the rut. 
(Yunus, Banker to the Poor 42,58)  
 
Grameen prides itself in treating each impoverished individual as a fully 
equal member of society, avoiding the paternal approach often recounted by those 
receiving assistance from organizations such as the World Bank.  “In a modern 
economy, each economic entity or group has its own engine.  The combined 
power of the engines pushes and pulls the economy forward.  The power will be 
reduced if those in the back are ignored” (Yunus, Banker to the Poor 212).  In 
Yunus’ book, he explains that he expects a lot out of the loan officials, and is 
upfront about the work.  The loan officials must be prepared to understand the 
mentality of the poor and to spend time working with the destitute while working 
and living in harsh conditions (Yunus, Banker to the Poor 134).   
 The Grameen system also owes much of its early success to its simple 
formula for repayment mechanisms (which has since been fine-tuned).  Loans last 
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one year, installments are paid weekly, repayment rates start one week after the 
loan, interest rates are 20 percent, and repayment amounts to 2 percent of the loan 
amount per week for 50 weeks (Yunus, Banker to the Poor 68-69).  In addition, 
Grameen assumes every borrower is honest.  Prior to Grameen, women 
constituted less than 1 percent of all borrowers in Bangladesh, whereas women 
make up 96 percent of Grameen’s borrowers (Tharoor np).   
As a result of the pioneering success of Grameen, Yunus has become the 
outspoken face, and even salesman, for the microfinance industry, as well as for 
the field of development in general.  At the Committee of Donor Agencies for 
Small Enterprise Development’s June 1988 international meeting in Washington, 
Yunus was the principal speaker.  Ditcher has explained that at the meeting, the 
debate between technical assistance versus credit became more pronounced, and 
“…NGOs were called upon as naturals to provide credit to the microenterprises 
run by the very poor,” because it was assumed that “they were ideologically 
motivated and, as grassroots practitioners, appropriately positioned.  Banks and 
governments, it was claimed, could not be counted upon to reach the poor 
effectively.”  A new type of financial intermediary, the MFI, came to be discussed 
more widely during this time (Dichter, Introduction 3).   
Shortly thereafter, experiments in microfinance began to spread, and the 
World Bank began to take interest.  In the 1990s, there was a push to make 
microfinance practices more business-like.  CGAP was formed in 1995 by a 
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group of major donors and created a secretariat housed at the World Bank.25
In recent years, a uniform set of “best practices” has evolved and been 
promoted across the world.  At times, these “best practices,” which embody the 
microfinance methods used by successful MFIs, have been copied in other 
regions, sometimes without significant attention devoted to unique social, 
economic, and political environments.  Many observers note that these attempts at 
replicating “best practices” have been mostly disappointing.     
  
There were a series of exhaustive manuals produced, and some academics became 
interested in studying microfinance.  Within the industry, the focus began to be as 
much on the lender as on the beneficiary (Dichter, Introduction 4).   
 
  
                                                            
25 Contributing institutions included the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the UN. CGAP originally stood for the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, but 
in 2003 the word “Poorest” was substituted with “Poor” (Dichter, Introduction 4-5). 
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MICROFINANCE OPERATIONS 
There are a wide variety of microfinance operations found in the world, 
across and within regions.  This includes great heterogeneity in terms of market 
penetration, supply, services, mission and philosophy, financing, lending 
methodology, organizational structure, and other characteristics.  The proceeding 
chapter provides an outline of the most common types of lending platforms, 
followed by the most common structures for MFIs.  
 
Group lending  
The group lending model, practiced by early MFIs, is what brought 
microfinance into the development lexicon.  The vast majority of worldwide 
microfinance operations, especially as practiced by NGOs and in rural areas, use 
the group lending method.  There are multiple variations of the group lending 
model, including village banking, ROSCAs, credit unions, and other structures, 
all of which share similar characteristics and approaches to the same goals.  In 
Latin America, this model is far less prevalent than in other parts of the world, 
comprising only about 10 percent of microlending, about half of which are 
customers of Compartamos in Mexico (Berger, The Latin American Model of 
Microfinance 14).     
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Typically, the group lending model is carried out by administering a single 
loan to a group, then dispersing portions of the loan among individual members of 
the group for their specific needs.  Each member gets a portion of the loan for 
their own business, and if one member fails to pay, in most cases the rest of the 
group is required to cover their payment (this effectively clouds actual repayment 
rates).  The group lending model especially is important for the poorest members 
of society and for females, due to the fact that they typically lack collateral and 
possess little, if any, credit history.  For the same reason, group lending is also the 
most effective means to reach people in rural areas. 
This shared risk is advantageous for the loan portfolios of MFIs, and is the 
reason that high repayment rates are maintained.  Social pressure is a strong 
deterrent to missing a payment.  If a group wants to ensure the availability of 
future credit, each individual’s loan portion must be repaid.  One reason this 
system is advantageous is because of the ability it has to utilize local knowledge 
of the risks involved with lending to specific individuals.  MFIs often report that 
the most important reason for failure of repayment is when the loan is used for 
things other than which it is intended.  Because members of a group monitor one 
another, group lending is meant to mitigate such situations.  The downside, 
however, comes with the fact that groups may exclude the poorest members of the 
community, whom they may consider unfit to repay. 
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One of the reasons group lending is so common, especially with NGOs, is 
that much of the management takes place within the group, eliminating the need 
for employee hours spent in activities such as analyzing risk and collecting and 
disbursing individual payments.  Ultimately, the main advantage of this model is 
that it replaces collateral with a shared risk, utilizing collective responsibility and 
peer pressure as a means of assuring repayment.  Under this model repayment 
rates below 95 percent are typically considered unsatisfactory, and repayment 
rates nearing 100 percent are common. 
Village saving and loan associations, which are one of the oldest forms of 
microfinance and have been around for centuries, are a variant of the group 
lending model.  This platform is often, though not necessarily, categorized as 
microfinance.  These organizations usually consist of 15 to 30 people who pool 
their savings, then borrow from the collective funds.  These organizations are 
highly democratic; all transactions occur in front of the group, funds are usually 
kept in a box with multiple locks, and keys are held by different members.  The 
group sets the interest rate, all interest is returned to the box, and at the end of 
year the group performs an ‘action audit’ and distributes resources to members.  
Because of high interest rates on loans, returns on savings are typically 30 percent 
or more.  All funds stay within the group, and while these organizations don’t 
necessarily require an official MFI, most are managed by local NGOs (Rippey 
119).   
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Credit unions, or Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) 
share basic characteristics with village savings and loan associations.  In this 
system a number of people form a group and contribute an agreed amount on a 
regular basis.  At each meeting the fund is usually given to one person who takes 
all the money, until everyone in the group has received the money in turn.  Every 
transaction occurs during meetings in front of every member.  The order of 
rotation may be determined by ballot, by age or seniority, or other social systems 
of preference.  This is an attractive method especially due to its simplicity and 
transparency.  
Non-profit credit unions and ROSCAs, which have no external 
shareholders, are similar to microfinance NGOs in that their mission and priority 
typically is to service the needs of the poor.  They are usually registered entities 
subject to commercial laws, but are not typically regulated or supervised under 
banking laws.  These organizations are member-owned and provide financial 
services only to members.  Usually this includes savings and loan services, and in 
some cases insurance as well.  Membership in a credit union has traditionally 
been based on a common bond such as shared employment or membership in the 
same community.  Therefore, this approach entails substantial member 
participation (Montgomery and Weiss 31).  
In the most popular group lending model, as practiced by Grameen and 
FP, members of a (normally) self-selected group of a predetermined size receive a 
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loan in a lump sum, then the credit is dispersed amongst the individual members, 
under the supervision of a credit official, or an asesora as FP terms it.26
In FP’s CME program, which uses the group lending platform, an 
interested group of women is first given a presentation about the program by an 
asesora.  After deciding to work with CME, there are four meetings that the self-
selected group of at least 15 members must attend.  This includes an initial 
informative meeting, a meeting in which the women choose a name for their 
group and elect officers, a signing meeting in which the group prepares for 
hypothetical problems that could arise, and a final meeting to complete the 
remaining paperwork and set schedules for the group.  The final meeting includes 
  Many 
times the credit is explicitly intended to launch a new small business venture, 
while other times the business may already exist.  At Grameen, all the members of 
the group of five prospective borrowers have to present themselves at the bank, 
undergo at least seven days of training on policies, and demonstrate their 
understanding of those policies in an oral examination administered by a senior 
bank official.  Yunus points out that each of the members must be individually 
tested, and it can take anywhere from a few days to several months for a group to 
be recognized and certified by Grameen Bank (Yunus, Banker to the Poor 63).   
                                                            
26 FP’s asesoras tend to be women in their early 20’s, many of whom are attending college. Their 
position requires them to complete administrative tasks involved with lending, provide training, 
and to command a group of women often more than twice their age during committee meetings, 
acting as an intermediary to solve problems with issues such as members not repaying their loans. 
At times, these meetings become very heated. FP’s asesoras are paid significantly less than credit 
officials for the individual lending program.  
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a meal or symbolic gesture amongst the women, which is meant to establish a 
bond between them (Heter 51-52).   
After the fourth meeting, the group is eligible to take out a loan.  It usually 
does so within one week of the final meeting, and this requires all loan recipients 
to travel together to the regional office to individually sign for their portion of the 
loan and to present their national identification cards.  From then on, payments 
are made on a weekly basis, and loans can be distributed in cycles from 12-16 
weeks.  In addition, obligatory group savings are collected and deposited in a 
financial institution chosen by the group (due to regulations that limit NGOs from 
accepting deposits, FP cannot collect savings itself) (Heter 52).27
 
  
Individual lending 
Individual lending, which is the most prevalent type of microfinance in 
Latin America, is usually similar to lending operations carried out by traditional, 
formal banking institutions.  Especially within the last several years, individual 
loans for microenterprise and consumer purposes have increasingly been offered 
by MFIs, throughout the world.  In this model an individual is solely responsible 
for the payment of their own loan, and the procurement of credit is usually based 
upon past credit history, references, collateral, and the type and validity of 
                                                            
27 Beginning in August of 2008 FP was beginning to implement significant changes in the CME 
program. 
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business venture.  In this system MFIs are generally less discerning and formal 
than a typical commercial bank would be.  Usually, instead of a formal risk 
analysis, credit officials conduct informal interviews with the entrepreneurs and 
are expected to be familiar with the individual’s situation and business.   
Individual microlending is most often implemented by MFIs that are more 
commercially oriented, and is the most common method found in urban settings.  
In recent years, many MFIs, including non-profit MFIs and even the new 
Grameen II system, have shifted towards individual lending operations in order to 
satisfy demand and take advantage of its flexibility in loan terms and amounts.   
The majority of FP’s clients are served by individual lending.  Operations 
are essentially the same as those found at commercial banks, and a credit check is 
usually performed in order to ensure a client’s reliability.  Interest rates for the 
individual lending program are around 40 percent, and profits serve to subsidize 
other FP programs.  In individual lending operations at FP, a business must have 
already been established in order to receive credit.  Often, collateral is a 
requirement for an individual to get a loan.  The courtyard at the San Lorenzo 
office housed several pieces of collateral, including a motorcycle and a washer 
and dryer. 
One drawback attributed to this model is that it may leave out the poorest 
individuals, who typically cannot provide the collateral required.  Also, MFIs 
targeting individual borrowers face higher transaction costs when offering small 
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loans to individuals.  The 2005 Microbanking Bulletin database showed that 
average loan amounts range from almost $1,000 for individual lenders, $370 for 
smaller groups, and $136 for larger groups.  About 90 percent of the members of 
the larger groups are women, but over half the individual borrowers are men 
(Harper 38-39). 
 
MFI Structures 
 
(Montgomery and Weiss 34) 
In addition to a variety of differences in lending methodology, there are 
also a wide range of organizational and legal structures among MFIs, each 
possessing unique advantages and disadvantages.  Historically, microfinance 
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projects have typically begun with seed money from donors or locally subsidized 
projects, making the NGO the most common MFI legal structure found today 
(Arvelo, Bell and Novak 131).  The poverty-alleviating success of the NGO 
approach to microfinance, practiced by early pioneers such as the Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh, is what has catalyzed worldwide interest among development 
thinkers.  On the other hand, commercial success demonstrated by MFIs such as 
Compartamos in Mexico or the NGO-turned commercial bank BancoSol 
(formerly Prodem) in Bolivia have sparked interest from the business sector.   
There are several advantages of NGO status.  For one, NGOs avoid heavy 
taxation or intervention from regulatory government agencies.  Most NGOs are 
sustained by subsidized loans, donations, and grants, so they are able to focus 
more on improving lives and less on adhering to bureaucratic regulations in areas 
such as accounting or tax procedures.  The NGO label ensures that the institution 
is trying to fulfill a social mission, which makes it easier to secure philanthropic 
funding if needed (Arvelo, Bell and Novak 131).  NGOs also are more closely 
able to assess the needs of the local poor, and commonly provide training and 
education when disbursing loans, as well as a range of other services poor 
communities benefit from.  They also do more to reach the poorest of the poor, 
and more often have penetrated rural markets that commercial MFIs typically 
avoid due to high operating costs.  There are numerous extra costs associated with 
providing financial services to individuals in rural areas, who are often the poorest 
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members of society.  These difficulties include language or cultural barriers, weak 
telecommunications and infrastructure, and especially distance.   
The NGO approach also has several major drawbacks that are frequently 
discussed.  The main disadvantage is that, due to existing laws, the NGO status 
generally limits the types of financial services that can be provided.  Most 
important among these disadvantages is the fact that in most countries, NGOs 
cannot legally offer savings services, which are in very high demand.  This limits 
their ability to use client deposits as a way to finance other parts of the 
organization’s operations, which can limit their scale of operations.  The ability of 
an MFI to offer savings is very important in targeting poverty, as it has been 
repeatedly shown that poorer clients are more attracted towards savings, while the 
better off are more in need of credit.  NGOs also face limitations that restrict 
access to domestic or international capital markets.  In some countries where 
NGOs have reached a significant scale, regulators have either come up with a 
regulatory framework for MFIs separate from banks, such as in Bolivia, or have 
allowed the sector to flourish unregulated, as in Bangladesh (Montgomery and 
Weiss 32).   
  According to much of the literature on microfinance, the biggest 
drawback faced by non-profit MFIs is that they are inefficient and unable to stand 
on their own financially.  Some observers argue that subsidies have ended up 
funding inefficient and careless management practices that have resulted in 
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limited outreach, high loan default rates, and unsustainable operations (Bhatt and 
Tang 321).  Many MFIs claim ‘operational sustainability,’ but in reality the vast 
majority still require donor subsidies to cover their capital cost.28
Recently, the industry has morphed to include an increasing number of 
for-profit MFIs, including government-owned development banks, reformed state 
banks, and commercial banks, in addition to a number of NGOs that have 
“commercialized” their operations.  An increasing number of traditional, non-
profit MFIs in the form of NGOs also are changing their legal and organizational 
structures to more closely resemble those of traditional banks.  Usually this is 
done in an attempt to achieve financial self-sustainability, earn a profit, reach 
more people, and/or to offer a wider variety of financial services.   
  In 2004 Drew 
Tulchin looked at 10,000 MFIs and found that as few as 1-3 percent were both 
financially self-sufficient and had positive net incomes (Tulchin 10). 
These institutions often “scale up” by becoming non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI) or a company, which enables them to provide more 
comprehensive credit products, limited deposits, and achieve regulatory 
supervision.29
                                                            
28 For example, between 1985 and 1996 the Grameen Bank reported “profits” of $1.5 million, but 
as Jonathan Morduch observed, when modest adjustments are made to standardize Grameen’s 
accounting practices and philanthropic subsidies on capital are considered, the bank would have 
actually incurred $34 million in losses during the same period (Morduch, The Microfinance 
Promise 1590-1591). 
  The next stage beyond the NBFI, which has been implemented by 
29 When institutions transform their operations, they have four basic options to attract the funds 
necessary for their future growth: donors, public savings, and local and international 
creditors/investors (Jansson, Microfinance: From Village to Wall Street 14).   
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the “scaling up” of operations for some NGOs such as BancoSol, is the move to 
become a full-fledged commercial bank, which allows the organization to freely 
collect deposits from the public (Arvelo, Bell and Novak 131).  As a result of the 
impressive profit margins some of these MFIs are realizing, even financial giants 
such as JP Morgan, Citigroup, and Deutsch Bank have entered this field that has 
traditionally been dominated by NGOs. 
From a regional perspective, Latin America is leading the way in 
transforming microfinance from a subsistence activity used to alleviate poverty to 
a profitable business.  Latin America is home to more financially sustainable 
MFIs than any other part of the world, clearly standing out as the region most 
driven by profit, and most often diverging from the group lending model.  During 
times of economic slowdown, MFIs in Latin America have held up as well or 
even better than their counterparts in the commercial banking sector (Jansson and 
Taborga 6).  According to studies carried out by MIX, Latin American MFIs have 
more assets, use greater leverage, and attract more commercial investments than 
MFIs in other regions (Callaghan, Gonzalez and Maurice 117).  Undoubtedly, the 
microfinance movement in Latin America is the most commercially-driven in the 
world.   
 Microfinance in Latin America has some defining characteristics that 
distinguish it from microfinance in Asia, Africa, or the transition of 
Eastern Europe.  Most of Latin America’s pioneers began as private, 
nonprofit institutions, working in urban markets.  MFIs have focused on 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
49 
 
credit as the primary service offered, only recently beginning to develop 
savings programs and expand their product lines in such areas as housing 
and remittances.  Although most of the pioneers did target the poor, and 
low income people still form the majority of microfinance customers, an 
exclusive focus on the poor is not the defining characteristic of Latin 
American microfinance, as it is for many Asian and African institutions.  
In Latin America, the emphasis has been on providing services to 
enterprises with insufficient access to financial services, and to the 
unbanked in general…Perhaps the most important defining characteristic 
of Latin American microfinance is the commercial orientation of its 
leading institutions with respect to operations, financial performance, 
financing, and ownership, an orientation now catching on in Asia as well.  
Other key features that define microfinance in Latin America are its 
adaptability and responsiveness to customer demand, its greater urban 
concentration, and the diversity of its customers. (Berger, The Latin 
American Model of Microfinance 2, 5) 
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SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
According to the ILO, “Nothing is more fundamental to poverty reduction 
than employment…Employment is a key link between economic growth and 
poverty reduction.  Productive and remunerative employment can help ensure that 
poor people share in the benefits of economic growth” (Karnani, Microfinance 
Misses its Mark 38).  In recent years development practitioners have focused on 
the shortage of quality jobs and begun to promote entrepreneurship through 
microcredit as a means of alleviating poverty and fostering development.   
The bulk of these microentrepreneurs supported by MFIs operate 
informally, and especially in Paraguay, many, if not most of these are “own-
account workers.”30  While microcredit has been a reasonably effective band-aid 
for the lack of employment options and financial limitations faced by the self-
employed in the informal economy,31 it is important to look at the types of jobs 
that microcredit “creates,” and to understand the characteristics of those jobs.32
                                                            
30 The term “own-account worker” is used to indicate the type of entrepreneur that make up a large 
portion of microfinance clients in developing countries, including those of FP. The ILO defines 
own-account workers as “those workers who, working on their own account or with one or more 
partners, hold the type of job defined as a self- employed job, and have not engaged on a 
continuous basis any employees to work for them during the reference period” (OECD, Glossary). 
“Workers in the informal economy include both wage workers and own-account workers. Most 
own-account workers are as insecure and vulnerable as wage workers and move from one situation 
to the other. Because they lack protection, rights and representation, these workers often remain 
trapped in poverty” (Chen 6). 
   
31 This denotes the portion of the economy that is not taxed or monitored by any form of the 
government, and usually is not factored into a country’s GDP. 
32 Most MFIs make little or no effort to track or encourage the regulation of their clients; several 
FP credit officials estimated that up to 80 percent or more of their clients work informally. 
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Martha Alter Chen explained that, “Despite its diversity, the informal 
economy can be usefully categorized by employment status into two broad 
groups: the self-employed who run small unregistered enterprises; and wage 
workers who work in insecure and unprotected jobs (although some, such as 
homeworkers, don’t fit neatly into either category)” (Chen 1).33  Multiple analysts 
have noted that it is useful to think of the informal labor market as being made up 
of two tiers (Fields et al.), which are comprised of a mixture of the dual 
classification provided by Chen.  In the upper tier, workers choose informal 
activities because of either the income it provides or because of other aspects such 
as working hours, access to markets, or being one’s own boss.  In the lower tier, 
workers are enticed by the ease of entry into the informal sector.  For these 
individuals, the informal sector is often a last-resort source of revenue (OECD, 
Fiscal Policy and Informality et al. 152).34
The countries of Latin America vary considerably in their levels of 
informality, though in all of them, the size of the informal economy is much 
higher than in the U.S.  Some countries in the region, including Paraguay, are 
among the most informal economies in the world.  The typical country in Latin 
   
                                                            
33 “[I]n most developing countries, the largest occupational categories within the informal 
economy include casual day laborers in agriculture and construction, small farmers, street vendors, 
domestic workers, workers in small unregistered factories or workshops, and industrial outworkers 
who work from their homes (aka homeworkers)” (Chen 1) (this description matches the types of 
microenterprises FP advertises its support for, reported on page 17 of this thesis). 
34 The OECD authors used a “crude proxy” for the lower tier by looking at the number of 
unskilled, self-employed individuals in the informal economy, which suggested that the lower tier 
is much larger in countries like Bolivia or Paraguay relative to more developed countries like 
Mexico or Argentina (OECD, Fiscal Policy and Informality 152).   
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America produces about 40 percent of GDP and employs 70 percent of its labor 
force informally (Loayza, Servén and Sugawara).35
The informal economy accounts for about 70 percent of Paraguay’s 
measured total GDP, which was the highest proportion found in a study of 32 
Latin American and Caribbean countries in the early 2000s (Vuletin 4).  Sixty 
percent of the country’s labor supply resides in urban areas (Aguilera 14).
    
36
                                                            
35 According to Schneider, between 1999 and 2005, underground activities accounted for nearly 
16 percent of GDP in the OECD nations and about 35 percent in developing countries (Bose, 
Capasso and Wurm 2).   
  
Overall, informal labor arrangements account for about half of Paraguay’s 
national workforce (Carter, Gacitúa Marió and Silva-Leander vi).  In comparison, 
unregistered labor contracts by private enterprises in the Mercosur area represent 
24 percent of total wage labor in Uruguay, 32 percent in Argentina, 38 percent in 
Brazil, and 68 percent in Paraguay (Tokman 51).  In part due to these high levels 
of informality, tax evasion in Paraguay is estimated at 60 percent; actual GDP 
figures are believed to be as much as 20 to 50 percent higher than those reported 
by the Central Bank (Carter, Gacitúa Marió and Silva-Leander V).  Outside of 
agriculture, self-employment makes up the greatest share of informal employment 
in all developing regions of the world.  It represents 70 percent of informal 
36 “As with other indicators, [in Latin America] national averages conceal sharp geographical 
differences: in rural areas (where own-account and unpaid family workers tend to account for over 
50 percent of the employed), vulnerable workers are much more common than in urban areas 
(where around 30 percent of workers are vulnerable)” (ECLAC 31). 
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employment in sub-Saharan Africa, 62 percent in North Africa, 60 percent in 
Latin America, and 59 percent in Asia (Chen 13-14).37
Robyn Davis pointed out that, “In Latin America, and Paraguay 
especially, informality is generally correlated with illegality, low wages, high 
labor supply, restricted access to financial markets, limited legal protection, 
insecure or non-existent property rights, payment of bribes, limited access to 
public services, absence of labor legislation/protection, and general employment 
insecurity, among other things” (Davis 1).  She is careful to make the point that 
as a result of the aforementioned problems, the terms “informal” and 
“microenterprise” sector often indicate the same socio-economic reality.   
   
In Paraguay, home surveys showed that only 13 percent of 
microentrepreneurs (defined as having 5 or more employees) earned less than the 
minimum wage.  However, of own-account workers, who make up an 
exceptionally large portion of Paraguay’s “entrepreneurial class,” 61 percent 
earned less than the minimum salary (Masi 18).38
                                                            
37 There is no official data kept on self-employment in Paraguay (Loayza, Servén and Sugawara 
11), but it is safe to assume the majority of Paraguay’s self-employed operate informally. 
  Paraguay and Bolivia are the 
only Latin American countries where the poverty rate of employed workers rose 
substantially between 1990 and 2006 (by about 4 percent) (ECLAC 31).  From 
1995 to 2004, wages for Paraguayans, including entrepreneurs (multiple 
employees) and the self-employed, decreased, while hours worked increased (see 
38 Since the self-employed, notably own-account operators, face low earnings and poor working 
conditions, some argue that own-account workers should be considered to be part of the working 
class and not the entrepreneurial class (Chen 6). 
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chart below).  It may be that microfinance serves to sustain these low earnings by 
pushing the strategy of self-employment, and thereby funneling 
microentrepreneurs, or own-account workers, into an already competitive and 
saturated labor market among mostly informal vendors and other small enterprise 
operators.39
 
 
 (Fazio and Tornarolli 39)
                                                            
39 In Bangladesh, where microfinance has flourished, more than 63 percent of the employed 
population in the capital city of Dhaka operates in the informal sector, which represents a sizeable 
increase over the last thirty years (UN Habitat 103). 
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(ECLAC 32) 
 
It needs to be noted that not all of those employed in the informal 
economy, microentrepreneurs or otherwise, would necessarily choose formal 
employment if given the chance.  Especially for women, informal self-
employment offers a flexible option that may be preferred due to familial 
obligations.  And just like informal workers, some formal workers live a life of 
poverty while some do not.  Therefore, some informal jobs provide incomes 
superior to some formal jobs, meaning that voluntary informal employment 
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certainly exists (Maloney, Self-Employment and Labor Turnover).  An important 
fact that should be considered is that microenterprises operating informally have 
an unfair advantage over those that operate their businesses legally, paying taxes 
and adhering to regulatory requirements.40
…the intimate association everywhere between microfinance and the rise 
of the informal sector has unequivocally resulted in the de-legitimisation 
of [the] legal process, undermined respect for the tax system, sanctioned a 
casual approach towards health and safety and environmental regulations, 
and has undermined the ability of democratically mandated governments 
to prohibit sharp business practices. Increasingly, a business either has to 
travel the ‘low road’ practices of the rapidly expanding informal sector, or 
it is forced under. (Bateman and Chang 21)  
     
 
Entrepreneurial ingenuity? 
The philosophy most outspokenly communicated by microfinance 
proponents is the belief that everyone is an entrepreneur.  This conviction is 
central to the microfinance revolution, and is widely touted by Yunus and others 
prominent in the microfinance arena, who associate microfinance with “the 
miracle of markets,” “entrepreneurial spirit,” and the power to “pull oneself up by 
the bootstraps.”  Unfortunately it really does take a special type of person to 
become a successful entrepreneur.  Most people, as evidenced by the very large 
number of failures among entrepreneurial start-ups, simply do not have the natural 
talents and traits necessary to reach any measure of considerable success as a 
                                                            
40 However, it is important to note that the informal labor environment is unique in every country. 
In more developed countries like Mexico or Brazil, enterprises may operate unregulated in order 
to save on things like taxes or labor, while in a country like Paraguay or Boliva, they operate 
unregulated because there are too many barriers to formality and there are usually few benefits. 
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business owner.  Necessary personal traits include creativity, risk-taking capacity, 
common sense, courage, a strong work ethic, energy, and the ability to deal with 
failure.  In developed countries with high levels of education and access to 
financial services, about 90 percent of the labor force are employees, not 
entrepreneurs (Karnani, Microfinance Misses its Mark 37).  In developing 
countries, where the conditions for success are not in place, entrepreneurs face 
even greater challenges. 
Dan Gallin notes that 
Microenterprise development has been seen by some as a first step to 
launch own-account home-based workers on a career as capitalist 
entrepreneurs…these views [are] inspired by neoliberal doctrine without 
any relationship to what happens in the real world.  As the BWA [Bureau 
for Workers Affairs of the ILO] has pointed out, “for the vast majority of 
dependent and own-account workers the informal sector is not a stepping 
stone to improvement but a strategy of survival.  (Gallin 542)41
 
 
The progression of informality in Latin America 
Within development circles, a lively debate has arisen as to what has 
driven the entrenchment of informal employment in so many parts of the world.  
The most common explanations for the phenomenon include: 
 
• Informality could largely be seen as a result of the type of development that 
fails to generate sufficient good jobs for all. This has been accentuated by 
                                                            
41 Very few formal sector enterprises start out in the informal sector units (Bateman and Chang 
10). 
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low capacity in the private and public sectors to accommodate rapid 
population and labor force growth and has been worsened by labor market 
discrimination and segregation between men and women, social groups 
and different occupations.  
 
• An increase in subcontracting driven by globalization and economic 
liberalization has led to greater diversity in the forms of informal 
employment. This in turn has led to a greater heterogeneity among 
informal workers, and an increase in the number of those with higher 
skills and productive capacity.  
 
• Formal regulations have mostly been designed for larger enterprises and 
are therefore often inadequate for the needs and conditions of the growing 
sector of micro-enterprises. Changes in labor regulations and/or in 
implementation of labor regulations may also have had an impact on the 
share of informality in the economy.  
 
• There has been informalization by employers of once-formal jobs as a 
strategy to lower labor costs and deal with competition. (Henrik Huitfeldt 
and Jütting 100)  
 
The growth of microfinance in Latin America, and in other parts of world, 
has paralleled macroeconomic changes and the institutionalization and growth of 
the informal economy.  Many of these drivers have been shaped in Latin America 
by a combination of the debt crisis, changes produced during the neoliberal era, 
and shifts caused by globalization.  The ripple effects produced by neoliberal 
policies in the labor market represented some of the most tangible results of 
structural adjustments for ordinary citizens.  Free market reforms left scores of 
individuals in the developing world grappling to find meaningful employment, 
especially in Latin America where the experiment was perhaps implemented in 
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the most extreme form and with greatest haste.42
  Neoliberal structural adjustment policies entailed the elimination of 
subsidies, cutbacks in social services, privatizations, and currency devaluations.  
Additionally, increased competition with foreign products caused many domestic 
businesses to fail after they were left to compete in freer markets with imported, 
often cheaper, products.
  Millions of displaced Latin 
American workers were forced to seek refuge in the informal economy, often 
turning to self-employment, supported by microfinance, as their most viable 
option.   
43
                                                            
42 In the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank gave an average of five adjustment loans to each country 
in Latin America (Easterly, The Elusive Quest 102). During the decade, the use of the term 
“informal sector” became popular, as the economic crisis in Latin America highlighted the fact 
that employment in the informal sector tends to grow during periods of economic crisis (Chen 4). 
  In not just Latin American but in multiple parts of the 
world, these types of changes resulted in immense increases in unemployment and 
underemployment, leading to greatly increased competition for jobs as millions of 
former state employees and other displaced workers were abruptly forced into the 
labor market to compete for gainful employment.  With the added pressures of 
globalization, these changes also perpetuated migration from rural to urban areas, 
further increasing the labor supply.  Since growth in formal private employment 
did not compensate for these lost jobs, this “forced former employees to create 
43 Competition with imports, especially when introduced at a rapid pace, creates significant 
transformations throughout the respective industries; profit margins could increase in some cases, 
diminish slightly, or other times entirely vanish. “Firms respond by shifting resources toward 
industries in which profitability has risen and away from those in which it has fallen” (Phillip and 
Slaughter 5). This causes more workers to be needed in newly profitable sectors and fewer in less 
profitable sectors (Phillip and Slaughter 5). As a result, demand for labor with certain skills may 
have fallen, even as labor shortages may have existed in other industries.   
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their own economic solutions through petty enterprise,” which was a form of 
economic adaptation that became the major source of employment creation in 
Latin America (Portes and Hoffman et al. 48).   
In Latin America in the 1990s, 70 percent of the jobs created were in the 
informal sector (United Nations: ECLAC and UNEP 48).44  Some have contended 
that the informal sector has more than doubled in Latin America since the 1980s 
(Bateman and Chang 13).  Emilio Klein and Victor Tokman found that in Latin 
America, microenterprises accounted for 100 percent of all new urban jobs in 
1998, and of every 100 new urban jobs created between 1990 and 1998, 30 were 
created in small enterprises and another 29 were in self-employment (Hoffman 
and Portes 48).45
Hence, in an effort to satisfy the increased demand for small lines of credit 
produced by these changes, the microfinance revolution was born, catering to 
what could be referred to as “forced entrepreneurs.”  Microfinance has flourished 
as a response to these structural changes in the labor market, also assisted by a 
decrease in money supply.
   
46
                                                            
44 Timothy Nourse puts the figure at 84 percent of new jobs, which accounted for 54 percent of all 
employment opportunities (Nourse 61).   
  NGOs, development organizations, and commercial 
45 These proportions are substantially higher than those during ISI periods. Between 1950 and 
1980, 60 percent of all new employment was created in the formal sector, with government 
accounting for 15 percent and modern large and medium enterprises contributing the remaining 45 
percent (Hoffman and Portes 49).   
46 In comparison with the earlier era of ISI, “the present era registers a visible increase in income 
inequality, a persistent concentration of wealth in the top decile of the population, a rapid 
expansion of the class of micro-entrepreneurs, and a stagnation or increase of the informal 
proletariat” (Hoffman and Portes 1). Portes and Hoffman believe that the rise of informal self-
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banks recognized the increased demand for microenterprise credit and stepped in 
to meet it, sparking an explosion in what was once a small scale, grassroots 
poverty alleviation strategy.47
 
  It is no coincidence that microfinance really began 
to take off in Latin America at the culmination of this period, as many of Latin 
America’s MFIs began with an expressed intention to support microenterprise. 
 
 (Klein and Tokman 12) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
employment and micro-entrepreneuralism throughout Latin America can be interpreted as a direct 
result of neoliberal adjustment policies (Hoffman and Portes 41). 
47 Marconi and Mosley have noted that in Bolivia, microfinance realized spectacular growth, as 
displaced workers were pushed into “…self-employment, in which function they found 
themselves strongly supported by several donors (especially USAID and IDB) and by a centre-
right government which saw microfinance as a particularly appropriate technique for ‘mitigating 
the social cost of adjustment.” (Marconi and Mosley 238) 
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 (Masi 6) 
 
Causes of informality in Paraguay 
Masi has pointed out that the reasons for the increase in activity in the 
informal economy are distinct in Paraguay.  Unlike other countries in the region, 
this phenomenon is not directly tied to structural adjustments reforms, or the 
modernization of the industrial sector.  Instead, the increase in informality is 
mainly related to internal migration and economic hardships (Masi 1, 12).  He has 
argued that in Paraguay, unlike most other countries in Latin America, the causes 
for deteriorating employment and the rise of informal employment are not found 
in the diminution of the state nor in the process of accelerated industrialization.  
Rather, he attributes it to the deterioration of income levels in the rural sector and 
the dynamism in import and re-exportation activity (Masi). 
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The growth of the labor supply that occurred in urban areas, fueled by 
migration, could not be absorbed by the economy that was based in agriculture 
and re-exportation.  This led to growing levels of underemployment and informal 
employment (Masi 12).  As highlighted by home surveys conducted by the 
government, a decrease in employment opportunities led to a deterioration of 
living conditions in the late 1990s in Paraguay.  Underemployment was the 
principle source of job creation in the 1990s, in the form of own-account workers, 
domestic service, and microenterprise, which decreased salaries and increased 
inequality.  This deterioration of employment conditions coincided with the 
absence of reforms and economic stagnation and recession (Masi).   
Paraguay is consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries in the 
world, so it is important to note that levels of corruption are closely correlated 
with the size of the informal economy.48
                                                            
48 In an empirical investigation of forty-nine countries, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and 
Pablo Zoido-Lobatón found a statistically significant relationship between the various measures of 
bribery and corruption and the informal economy. “In summary, the relationship between the 
share of the unofficial economy and rule of law (including corruption) is strong and consistent 
across eight measures provided by six distinct organizations. All eight of the indices suggest that 
countries with more corruption have a higher share of the unofficial economy” (Schneider and 
Enste 27). 
  Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Enste 
recounted that, “Corruption is sometimes involved in: satisfying regulations and 
obtaining licenses to engage in particular activities (opening a shop, operating 
taxi), land zoning and similar official decisions, access to publicly provided goods 
and services, decisions regarding procurement or public investment contracts, 
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control over the provision of tax incentives, and hiring and promotion within the 
public sector” (Schneider and Enste 90).   
While in some ways the causes of the entrenched nature of the informal 
economy may be different in Paraguay than in other Latin American countries, 
the informal sector shares similar characteristics such as relative insecurity and 
uncertainty of employment, low salary levels, and being the major source of 
employment in urban areas (Masi 1).  Masi has stated that “the majority of 
informal workers in Paraguay are non-professional, self-employed workers and 
employees of micro-enterprises [who are] involved in commercial and service 
activities, are located in the most densely populated urban areas, have a primary 
education [and earn] salaries equal to or less than the minimum wage” (Masi 1).49  
Since the rise of this sector in the 1980s, it has taken on a “fundamental role” in 
Paraguay’s economy, and has particular relevance for microentrepreneurship and 
women in the labor force (Robles 129).50
 
   
Paraguay’s regulatory problems 
Paraguay is a country with numerous, significant obstacles to overcome if 
it is to set itself on a path towards prosperity.51
                                                            
49 Translation by Heter (2008), pg. 24. 
  If microfinance is to play a part, 
the tools for success must be put in place.  In the World Bank’s 2010 “Doing 
50 Translation by Heter (2008), pgs. 23-24. 
51 As of 2008 Paraguay was one of the Latin American countries furthest from achieving the first 
MDG, to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, along with Guatemala, Honduras, and Bolivia 
(ECLAC 14-15). 
65 
 
Business” report, an annual series of reports that investigates the regulations that 
enhance business activity and those that constrain it, Paraguay is ranked 124th out 
of 183 countries in ease of doing business (Doing Business 4).52
 
  In addition to 
the problems informally employed individuals face, Paraguay’s extremely high 
levels of informality undermine the domestic business environment, weakening 
any hope for significant economic development.  Informality has a statistically 
and economically significant negative impact on growth and an equally 
significant positive impact on the incidence of poverty across countries (Loayza, 
Servén and Sugawara 14).   
 (Doing Business 1) 
                                                            
52 Bolivia, home to one of the world’s most active microfinance environments, is a country 
characterized by similar levels of both informality and development. The report ranks it 158th 
(Doing Business). 
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In Paraguay, as in other developing countries, the lack of judicial 
protection accorded by informal status is not only tied to vulnerability, but for 
microenterprises also restricts access to the legal system in important areas like 
contract enforcement.  This is an area that poses significant obstacles in 
developing countries, for both formal and informal firms.  Deficient legal systems 
greatly hinder cooperation between microenterprises, stunting their growth.  
When businesses avoid entering into contracts due to a perceived, and in many 
cases, serious lack of enforcement, it has a significant impact on a country’s 
business environment, with great detriment to the economy.   
One drawback is the fact that microentrepreneurs that produce value-
added goods are limited in their ability to negotiate contracts with companies that 
may want to utilize their services.  Informal entrepreneurs also are limited in their 
ability to sign contracts with suppliers they buy from, which could offer them 
discounted rates and improved payment options.  Furthermore, the lacking 
regulatory environment makes it difficult for small business owners to employ 
others, as potential employees may avoid certain offers due to the fact that there is 
little or no legal recourse for unfair treatment or wages.   
These are the types of problems that Hernando De Soto has emphasized, 
which has garnered him Nobel attention.  He is especially concerned by the fact 
that dubious property rights laws cause people to be undercapitalized (De Soto, 
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The Mystery of Capital),53
As in many developing countries, in Paraguay, the deficient, 
disadvantageous regulatory environment and legal regime, which leads to and is 
exacerbated by high levels of informality, may be one of the strongest obstacles 
keeping microfinance from reaching its full development potential.  With little or 
no avenue for legal recourse, it is difficult for businesses to operate at optimal 
efficiency, and negative spillover effects reverberate throughout the economy.  
 which is a problem that poses major difficulties for 
both formal and informal enterprises in developing countries.  He has argued the 
importance for developing countries to construct a legal system that protects 
individual property rights, enforces contracts, to devise a system to define and 
records deeds, patents, and copyrights, and to establish a rule of law and system 
of civil courts.  Together, these changes will bring out the value in dormant saving 
and latent intellectual potential in developing countries (Kemp np).  “When 
property law works, the capital value of assets rises in developing nations” (De 
Soto, Law and Property Outside the West 350).  De Soto also notes that 
establishing a functioning property law regime would bring the underground 
economy to the surface.  With these systems properly in place, the effectiveness 
of microfinance would soar. 
                                                            
53 For example, "The single most important source of funds for new businesses in the United 
States is a mortgage on the entrepreneur's house. These assets can also provide a link to the 
owner's credit history, an accountable address for the collection of debt and taxes, the basis for the 
creation of reliable and universal public utilities, and a foundation for the creation of securities 
(like mortgage-backed bonds) that can then be rediscounted and sold in the secondary markets" 
(De Soto, Law and Property Outside the West 350-351). 
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The insufficient legal and regulatory environment in Paraguay severely constricts 
microenterprise development, and does little to provide the tools necessary for 
entrepreneurial success. 
 
Personal observations and conclusion 
The entropy of Paraguay’s highly informal, highly competitive economy is 
unmistakable in many of its urban areas.  In parts of Asunción and outlying areas, 
and especially in Ciudad del Este, the bustling informal market is more than 
evident; it actually jumps out at you, sometimes in the form of shouting street 
vendors selling miscellaneous items, and even attractive young women employed 
by shops to entice or even literally drag passing men into their stores.  In heavily 
occupied market areas it is actually necessary to step off the sidewalk to get 
around the perfunctorily placed, overcrowded spaces occupied by 
microenterprises.  Particularly in Ciudad del Este, it is nearly impossible to avoid 
the deluge of informal microentrepreneurs hawking their wares to all passer-bys.  
These microenterprises, which sometimes may consist of no more than an 
“entrepreneur” with a box of assorted goods, sell anything from fruit, candy, and 
gum, to cell phones and pirated DVDs.   
Even on the buses in Asunción, informal “entrepreneurs,” or own-account 
workers, who are often young, sometimes unaccompanied children, sell trinkets 
and small food items from makeshift displays.  In the stands on the streets, 
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entrepreneurs commonly sell (often contraband) clothing and other goods like 
shoes or cell phones and electronics.  Frequently, identical goods can be found at 
neighboring stands throughout the area, or many times at the very next stand.  
Typically these vendors pay a modest monthly fee to rent their space, but other 
times makeshift stands can be found in seemingly desultory locations.  There are 
also owners and employees of medium-sized enterprises, which usually occupy 
permanent physical spaces, who shop these bustling, microenterprise-lined streets 
in order to find good buys on items like clothing.  They then resell the clothing in 
their own shops in more exclusive parts of town, at significantly higher prices.  
According to an employee of a trendy clothing store in an affluent area of 
Asunción, these markups can be more than 500 percent. 
One of the more troubling characteristics of Paraguay’s economy is the 
fact that many of the products sold by these microenterprises are regularly 
smuggled from Argentina and Brazil through Ciudad del Este, one of the world’s 
most heavily trafficked points of entry for smuggled goods.54
After visiting these businesses and speaking with entrepreneurs that utilize 
microfinance, it seems that most of them can be categorized as own-account 
  This does little to 
support Paraguayan industry (small as it may be), and not only is the government 
missing out on much needed tax revenues that are circumvented by the informal 
nature of these businesses, but it also misses out on import duties.   
                                                            
54 As of early 2000 it was estimated that Ciudad del Este made up about 73 percent of Paraguay’s 
border trade (Braumann, Jaramillo and Jenkner 20). 
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workers, who occupy the “lower tier” of informal work.  For them, self-
employment is not a path out of poverty and into economic success, but a coping 
mechanism.  The words of FP’s credit officials in the San Lorenzo office illustrate 
this claim; when asked why their clients are self-employed, and need microcredit, 
the almost uniform response is that they are trying to “sobrevivir,” or survive. 
These microfinance clients participate in saturated, extremely competitive 
labor and product markets, and many would work elsewhere if the opportunity 
existed (which, if it did, would decrease competition, allowing those remaining in 
the market to grow and become more profitable).  Perhaps most obvious is that 
microfinance alone, even when tied with programs like business training and 
health initiatives, is not enough to significantly improve this situation.  Substantial 
regulatory reforms are needed, offering less burdensome paths to formality and 
improved access to the legal system, which is in crucial need of improvement.  
This would decrease the precarious nature of informal self-employment by 
allowing microentrepreneurs to utilize social services, and promote inter-firm 
cooperation by increasing the incentive to enter into contracts.  However, the 
quality and quantity of those social services also need to be improved, and 
corruption must be greatly reduced.  These are lofty goals, but are absolutely 
critical if development is to be set in motion and if microfinance is to reach its full 
potential in the process. 
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THE MICROFINANCE MARVEL 
Introduction 
Microcredit can offer a legitimate solution to poverty for millions of 
people.  Access to financial services is an important ingredient for economic 
development in the modern global economy, and can be especially fruitful within 
a sound macroeconomic climate.  Worldwide success stories of individuals and 
families propelled from poverty by microcredit are impossible to ignore, 
especially when the story is that of a woman in a male-dominated society.   
For many, especially in developing countries, self-employment is one of 
few practical solutions to lack of opportunity and the resulting poverty.  This 
truth, which is repackaged and sold as entrepreneurial spirit and the miracle of 
markets, has helped to spread billions of dollars worldwide through a thriving 
microfinance market.  Microcredit can be provided to entrepreneurs in some of 
the poorest and most remote areas of the world, funneled through the world’s 
largest governments, development organizations, banks, corporations, groups of 
entrepreneurs themselves, or even individual lenders across the world using 
internet sites like Kiva or Microplace.    
One of the strongest reasons that microcredit and thereby microfinance has 
achieved such a strong backing is that it is not a handout; microcredit is a 
philosophy of self-empowerment.  Attractively, microfinance is about local 
processes, and until recently as a result of its growth and the advent of 
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commercialization, was a grassroots strategy that involved no large corporations 
or intervention from hegemonic powers.   
While microfinance has taken off and realized phenomenal growth, touted 
for its social and economic development capabilities, aside from its apparent 
effectiveness on an individual scale, the strategy of providing financial services, 
and especially promoting self-employment, has yet to be demonstrated to be an 
effective instrument for progress on an aggregate level.  Some even allege that 
microfinance constrains true development.55
Meanwhile, countries such as China, Vietnam, and South Korea have 
experienced very substantial improvements in wellbeing in the absence of a 
strong microfinance presence (Karnani, Microfinance Misses its Mark 37).  
Economists agree that throughout world history, most significant progress in 
terms of development was inculcated through state intervention and large 
investments.  Though the top-down, state-led paradigm has failed developing 
  Even in countries like Bangladesh 
and Bolivia where the microfinance movement is among the strongest in the 
world, noteworthy national indicators of development, such as the HDI, GDP per 
capita, and the GINI index, remain exceptionally low.  Where improvements in 
some areas have been made, a credible link to microfinance has not been clearly 
established.   
                                                            
55 In a 2008 letter to the Financial Times, for example, Milford Bateman wrote, “In nearly 25 years 
of academic and consulting work in local economic development, my experience is that 
microfinance programmes most often spell the death of the local economy” (Bateman, 
Microfinance's 'iron law'--local economies reduced to poverty np). 
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countries on multiple levels, never before has a nation achieved noteworthy 
measures of successful development through the proliferation of microenterprise.  
Therefore, numerous questions remain unanswered about microfinance and its 
ability to pull populations out of poverty.   
The impecunious traditionally have not had the option to take out a loan or 
utilize the services of a bank for savings, and while it is surely a good thing that 
microfinance has relieved this absence of financial services, and a sound financial 
sector is necessary for development, there has been too much focus on this 
particular strategy.  The microfinance movement is expanding extremely rapidly, 
perhaps even to the point of leaving room for exploitation and constricting 
significant progress on a wider scale.  Perplexingly, not everything about 
microfinance is as clear-cut and salubrious as it has been reported to the common 
observer. 
  After spending time in Paraguay with FP, it was not evident that 
microfinance and other services offered by the foundation, such as business 
training, were effectively enabling people to escape poverty.  While impressive 
programs optimizing synergies between education, training, and credit were 
emphasized by the foundation, it appeared that the majority of clients were simply 
using their loans to sustain their lifestyles, which appeared to be characterized by 
lack of opportunity and unpredictable earnings in extremely competitive, 
saturated labor and product markets.  Most of those in the middle class were there 
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because they began there, not because a small loan propelled them there.  
Additionally, many of the microentrepreneurs work long days, sometimes 12 to 
17 hours, and some hold multiple occupations. 
Furthermore, many clients of FP engage in extremely inefficient business 
practices, including making multiple trips to suppliers throughout the week to 
purchase small amounts of inventory at a time.  Practices such as these should not 
be necessary since the credit is meant for business expenses, to supply 
entrepreneurs with the capital to expand and to purchase in bulk, thus saving time 
and possibly providing a reduction in cost.  Additionally, many clients simply 
worked in microenterprises that were equally marginal, and often completely 
indistinguishable from the thousands of other microenterprises in the country, 
even those directly alongside them.56
Clearly, microfinance is a small part of the equation for progress in 
Paraguay, as in every other developing country in the world.  At this point in time, 
it serves more as a coping mechanism for those shut out of the formal labor and 
credit markets.  Doubts about the impact of microfinance on individuals and on 
the overall economy were cultivated by witnessing microfinance operations 
firsthand and further substantiated by the small, yet growing body of literature 
questioning the short and long-term prospects of microfinance.  For microfinance 
  Furthermore, in many of the 
microenterprises such as those selling clothing or fruits and vegetables, the 
majority of items were imported, sometimes illegally.  
                                                            
56 This led to a running joke among the FP interns that clients were employed in “copycat retail.” 
75 
 
to reach its potential and for real progress to occur, many other measures must be 
provided, many of which can only be offered by the state.   
With all the sensationalism surrounding the global MFI movement, the 
impression may be left that financial services for the poor are the cure-all for 
poverty.  Today nearly every major development organization participates in 
some aspect of microfinance.  The first part of this chapter will look at some of 
the remarkable triumphs that microfinance is said to have brought to the world’s 
poor, and includes a compendious survey of a few prominent studies that 
highlight these benefits.  In the second section of this chapter, some possible 
drawbacks and uncertainties related to the microfinance movement will be 
discussed.  The intention is to pose some questions about the potential for the 
effectiveness of microfinance in the long run, not just as a poverty alleviation tool 
for individuals but as part of a strategy that can place populations on the path to 
long term social and economic progress.  The overarching effort is to restore 
expectations to more realistic levels. 
 
Access to credit 
 In many parts of the world, the simple fact that the poor even have the 
option to utilize financial services traditionally reserved for the rich and well-
connected is revolutionary.  It is well-known that an effective financial system is 
necessary for a country to reach and sustain high levels of economic growth.  The 
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Global Director of Microfinance for Citigroup, Robert Annibale, estimated that 
2.5 billion people, or 40 percent of the world’s population, have never used a 
bank or formal credit institution (Smith and Thurman 40).  A CGAP survey found 
that various institutions targeting clients with an unmet demand for financial 
services included 750 million accounts, which translates into 500 million clients 
at most, comprising only a fraction of the world’s 3 billion or so poor people 
(Helms 6).57
According to CGAP, the microfinance industry is in the range of $30 
billion, and expanded lending 40 to 50 percent annually from 2004 to 2009 
(Copeland A12).  A 2007 report by McKinsey and Co. estimated that worldwide 
loan portfolios of MFIs have the potential to grow to $250-300 billion within the 
next couple of decades (Callaghan, Gonzalez and Maurice 118), and some experts 
have estimated that only about 10 percent of the world’s total demand for 
microfinance is being met (Hechler-Fayd'herbe 2).
   
58
 
  
 
 
 
                                                            
57 Ricardo Bebczuk of the IDB stated that “Limited financial inclusion does not simply follows 
[sic] from unfair discrimination against the poor, but to a great deal from a low demand for 
financial services and scarce access for the population at large” (Bebczuk 1). 
58 Again, it should be noted that these figures are highly contested. It has been widely assumed 
that just because the poor have no access to financial services, there is necessarily a demand 
(Dichter et al.).   
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(Marulanda and Otero 14) 
 
Across the world, the demand for credit and especially savings is 
particularly high in rural areas, which banks typically avoid.  One of the greatest 
challenges for microfinance, and a source of great potential, is to reach these rural 
areas where the majority of the poor live in Asia and Africa, and where the 
majority of the extreme poor live in Latin America.  Servicing microfinance 
clients in rural areas is much more expensive and far more difficult than in urban 
areas.  Transaction costs are much higher especially due to transportation 
difficulties and lower population densities that make it difficult to reach any level 
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of economies of scale.  The financial sustainability of rural microfinance is 
uncertain, and represents a major challenge for the future of microfinance 
(Callaghan, Gonzalez and Maurice et al. 118).  However, the fact remains that, in 
every population, rural communities are the most underserved by financial 
services.   
FP does have a rural microfinance program, but it is small and is faced 
with many obstacles, even though in many areas there is no competition.  The 
challenges mainly involve the distance of the customers to the offices, which 
makes payment collection and distribution of loans difficult.  The entire program 
consists of only one credit official, stationed in the main office in Asunción, 
servicing about 300 clients (as of the summer of 2008).  This necessitates 
overnight trips to rural areas to meet with borrowers.  Payment is often collected 
by local contacts, not official FP employees.  Operations for the rural program are 
sustained by funds accrued through the individual lending program and from the 
support of the IDB. 
 
Female empowerment 
Of the 1.2 billion people in the world that live on less than $1 a day, 900 
million of them are female (Smith and Thurman 122).  Microfinance has shown 
an exceptional ability to combat female poverty, which represents what is 
probably the greatest boon tied to microfinance.  Especially in cultures where 
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women are uniformly repressed, self-employment fueled by microcredit offers 
what is often the only outlet from a life of subjugation.  The 2006 Nobel 
Committee commented that “Microcredit has proved to be an important liberating 
force in societies where women in particular have to struggle against repressive 
social and economic conditions.  Economic growth and political democracy 
cannot achieve their full potential unless the female half of humanity participates 
on an equal footing with the male.” 
For women, self-employment can be an extremely useful method to 
improve their own situation and that of their family.  Due to the flexibility offered 
by self-employment, women are able to continue to care for their families and 
supplement family income while still being able to complete household chores, 
which can be far more onerous and obligatory than those in the developed world.  
Tales of women receiving small loans and improving their own lives and the lives 
of their children are widely disseminated in the media and marketing campaigns 
of MFIs.  These women are the poster children of the movement. 
It has been reported that access to microcredit and other financial services 
has led to benefits including improvements in familial nutrition and health and 
increases in education.  In addition, most observers consider note that the 
participation of rural women in microcredit programs helps to reduce the fertility 
rate.  Md. Abul Basher has even suggested that Grameen Bank weakens parental 
preferences for male children  (Basher 172, 182). 
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As a result of microfinance participation, a woman gains more control 
over her life by taking part in the management of family resources. After putting 
small loans and other services offered by MFIs to use, many women report greatly 
improved self-esteem and feeling a sense of purpose, sometimes for the first time 
in their lives.  In addition, there have been highly publicized anecdotal reports of 
women who suffered years of beatings from their husbands and report that the 
violence decreases or even ends after taking out a microloan to become self-
employed.  Furthermore, group lending systems have commonly been reported to 
forge community bonds or strengthen those that already exist.   
Academic literature has established that women tend to spend larger 
portions of their income than men on familial needs such as housing, health, and 
education, which is one of the main reasons MFIs with social goals focus on 
women.  In addition, women more often lack access to financial services and 
some consider them to be more responsible than men at repaying debt.  A New 
York Times article pointed out the advantages of increasing women’s incomes by 
looking at a research project that examined the different crops that men and 
women cultivate in the Ivory Coast.  There, men grow coffee, cocoa, and 
pineapples, while women grow plantains, bananas, coconuts and vegetables.  In 
her investigation, economist Esther Duflo of MIT found that when the men’s 
crops flourish, the households spent more money on alcohol and tobacco.  On the 
other hand, when the women had a good crop, the households spent more money 
on food (Kristof and WuDunn 4).  
81 
 
As a result of the aforementioned benefits, microfinance is probably the 
most valuable means devised to date for improving gender relations in developing 
countries.  Anecdotal accounts of empowerment against repression are the 
clearest demonstrations of the potential of microfinance, and it is these types of 
success stories that provided the spark that drove the movement to where it is 
today.59
  
  It should be noted there is a vast range in the type of microfinance 
services offered, from the ‘minimalist’ credit-only approach to the type that offers 
various social services and try to influence cultural change.  For example, 
Grameen’s Sixteen Decisions, which is recited by its group members at the start 
of every meeting, is meant to influence lives for the better in a number of 
categories, reaching far outside the financial realm. 
                                                            
59 On the other hand, there have also been widespread reports of women being publicly “shamed” 
for not paying their loans, in addition to reports of women taking out loans because their husbands 
are unable to, then having no say in how the credit is used. In other cases increases in domestic 
violence have actually been linked to microfinance participation (Hashemi, Schuler and Riley). 
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Grameen’s Sixteen Decisions 
1. We shall follow and advance the four principles of the Grameen Bank-discipline, unity, courage, and 
hard work-in all walks of our lives 
2. Prosperity we shall bring to our families 
3. We shall not live in a dilapidated house.  We shall repair our houses and work toward constructing 
new houses at the earliest opportunity. 
4. We shall grow vegetables all the year round.  We shall eat plenty of them and sell the surplus. 
5. During the plantation seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible. 
6. We shall plan to keep our families small.  We shall minimize our expenditures.  We shall look after 
our health. 
7. We shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn to pay for their education. 
8. We shall always keep our children and the environment clean. 
9. We shall build and use pit latrines. 
10. We shall drink water from tube wells.  If they are not available, we shall boil water or use alum to 
purify it. 
11. We shall not take any dowry at our sons’ weddings; neither shall we give any dowry at our 
daughter’s wedding.  We shall keep the center free from the curse of dowry.  We shall not practice 
child marriage. 
12. We shall not commit any injustice, and we will oppose anyone who tries to do so. 
13. We shall collectively undertake larger investments for higher incomes. 
14. We shall always be ready to help each other.  If anyone is in difficulty, we shall all help him or her. 
15. If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any center, we shall all go there and help restore 
discipline. 
16. We shall introduce physical exercises in all our centers.  We shall take part in all social activities 
collectively. (Yunus, Creating a World Without Poverty 58-59) 
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High expectations 
  Much of the euphoria surrounding microfinance comes from the 
academic literature that has established that microfinance can have tremendously 
positive effects on people’s lives.60  These almost universally positive findings 
have been reproduced through numerous academic works.  In order to get a sense 
of the portfolio of benefits attributed to microfinance, and what has created such 
sensationalism, a highlight of some of the more widely disseminated studies 
follows:61
-An early 1988 study found that Grameen members had incomes that were 43 
percent higher than incomes of control groups in non-program villages and 28 
percent higher than non-members in Grameen villages.  Wage rates throughout 
program villages also reportedly increased (Hossain). 
 
-In one of the most widely cited (especially by Yunus) studies, an assessment in 
the early 1990s focused on Grameen, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement 
Committee (BRAC), and RD-12, concluding that the women who were clients of 
these institutions increased household consumption by 18 takas for every 100 
borrowed, and that 5 percent of clients escaped poverty each year.  Spillover 
effects throughout the local village economy among non-members were also 
reported, including an increase in village wage rates (S. R. Khandker, Fighting 
Poverty with Microcredit).  
-A BRAC study found that basic competency in reading, writing, and arithmetic 
among children 11-14 years old in member households increased from 12 percent 
at the start of the program in 1992 to 24 percent in 1995 (only 14 percent of 
children of non-member households passed the competency tests in 1995) 
(Bhuiya and Chowdhury). 
                                                            
60 It should be noted that much of the early research was limited to a few countries, with the results 
often cited in support of replicating identical programs elsewhere. 
61 Many of these studies were cited by Hashemi, Littlefield, and Morduch as examples of how 
microfinance can help to achieve the MDGs. The authors did note that a few studies failed to find 
positive impacts from microfinance, or in rare cases discovered a negative impact, but “the 
frequency of such outcomes has been too low to cast much doubt on the generally favorable 
conclusion indicated by the bulk of the evidence” (Hashemi, Littlefield and Morduch 2).   
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 -In 1996 it was found that Grameen and BRAC participants with continued 
access to loans had lower rates of poverty than those without access, 57 percent 
compared to 76  percent (Khandker and Chowdhury).   
-A 1996 impact assessment of BRAC suggested that members who stayed in the 
program for more than four years increased household expenses by 28 percent and 
assets by 112 percent (Mustafa, Ara and Banu). 
-A 1996 survey of clients and non-clients in Bangladesh concluded that recipients 
of microcredit were significantly more empowered than non-clients in regards to 
their physical mobility, ownership and control of productive assets, involvement 
in decision making, and political and legal awareness.  This empowerment 
increased with the duration of the member (Hashemi, Schuler and Riley).62
-A 1999 examination of CRECER in Bolivia, which provides basic health 
education in addition to financial services, found that clients had better breast-
feeding practices, were more likely to give rehydration therapy to children with 
diarrhea, and had higher rates of DPT immunization for their children (Dunford 
and MkNelly). 
   
-In 2001 a Peruvian study showed that clients of MFIs earned $266 more per 
household member each year than non-clients (Arbuckle Jr. and Dunn).   
-In 2001 in Bolivia the cost of lifting a person out of poverty and out of extreme 
poverty through microfinance was calculated, in comparison to initiatives such as 
primary health, primary education, and rural road building.  Depending on the 
MFI, the average cost of moving an individual above the poverty line was 
between $300 and $600, which was cheaper than other alternatives examined, 
aside perhaps from rural health expenditures (Mosley).63
 
 
-A 2003 investigation in Bangladesh showed that a 10 percent increase in credit to 
women was associated with a 6.3 percent increase in mid-arm circumference of 
daughters.  There also was a statistically significant positive effect on height for 
boys and girls (Chowdhury, Khandker and Millimet). 
 
-A widely cited 2005 study of Bangladeshi microfinance participants found that 
members that had been participants for six consecutive years saw their poverty 
rates decline by more than 20 percent.  It was estimated that more than half of this 
                                                            
62 It was also found that in some cases increases in domestic violence were linked to microfinance 
participation, though over time families became more accepting and violence decreased (Hashemi, 
Schuler and Riley). 
63Although it was concluded that microfinance was not an effective means for reducing extreme 
poverty.  In the investigation with a sample of nearly 200, over six years, only one case was found 
in which an MFI had managed to reduce extreme poverty, and it was in an indirect manner 
through the labor market (Mosley 129). 
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reduction could be directly attributed to microfinance, and that microfinance 
accounted for 40 percent of the entire reduction of moderate poverty in rural 
Bangladesh (S. R. Khandker, Microfinance and Poverty). 
 
 
The Peace Corps supports microfinance for the following reasons:  
 
• Most of the goods and services needed to meet people’s basic needs in 
developing and redeveloping countries are provided by microenterprises.  
• Often microenterprises are the only economic organizations that function 
in times of crisis. 
• Microenterprises require small amounts of capital to enter the market and 
produce results quickly. 
• The small size of microenterprises makes them simple to operate. 
• Microenterprises use local products and skills. 
• Microenterprises are labor intensive and create jobs. 
• Microenterprises improve the income of the entrepreneurial poor. 
• Microenterprises are a catalyst for comprehensive community economic 
Development. (Peace Corps 1) 
 
Emerging Criticism 
For years, criticism of microfinance was almost absent, and the benefits 
reported to be associated with microfinance went almost universally 
unquestioned.  When criticism towards microfinance had been leveled, it was 
mostly met with denunciations (found in multiple microfinance blogs, comment 
forums, and public responses to articles such as those written by Dichter or 
Bateman).  Dichter has written that, due to a lack of reliable evidence, “anyone 
can say almost anything, and with the public relations surrounding the field, much 
of it goes unquestioned” (Dichter and Harper, What's Wrong with Microfinance? 
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5).  Especially as of the summer of 2009, critics have begun to come out of the 
woodwork, and earlier brazen promises of potential are being reexamined.   
In a surprising turn of events, Jonathan Morduch, a longtime microfinance 
advocate who has authored widely read textbooks and publications on the subject, 
admitted that, while economic theory suggests microfinance has benefits, 
“[r]igorous evidence that shows it happening just doesn’t exist … The evidence is 
pretty dicey” (Bateman and Chang 5).  Morduch wrote that, “strikingly, 30 years 
into the microfinance movement we have little solid evidence that it improves the 
lives of clients in measurable ways” (Morduch and Roodman 4).  He also 
conceded that microfinance “rarely generates new jobs for others” (Surowiecki 
np).  Even Elizabeth Littlefield, a World Bank director and the CEO of CGAP, 
has recognized that “there is no statistical evidence to support the idea that 
microfinance has a significant impact on poverty reduction on a global, or even a 
national, scale” (Hechler-Fayd'herbe 2).64
  Thomas Dichter of the libertarian Cato Institute is one of the most 
outspoken microfinance skeptics.
   
65  Within the last several years, his published 
opinions have ignited a cacophonous debate among microfinance practitioners.66
                                                            
64 She explained that microfinance improves lives on an individual scale through consumption 
smoothing and thwarting risk, and said that “a comprehensive history of analysis does not yet exist 
due to the nature of the industry and its clients” (Hechler-Fayd'herbe 2). 
  
65 Dichter is an author and seasoned development practitioner with considerable experience on the 
ground, including as a Peace Corp volunteer, country director in Yemen, and consultant with the 
Ford Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), USAID, the World 
Bank, and other organizations.   
66 A spokesman for Deutsche Bank claimed that one of Dichter’s articles “nearly caused a knife 
fight in our offices” (Margolis np).   
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As one of the few outspoken individuals warning against overconfidence and 
promises that may lead to disappointment, Dichter’s words are useful to get an 
idea of where he and other skeptics are coming from: 
Over-inflated expectations are unhelpful for several reasons.  First, there is 
an opportunity cost involved when so much attention is paid to one 
sector—inevitably other possible answers to poverty reduction get less 
attention, especially if they seem more complex or difficult.  Second, they 
propel more organizations to get involved in microfinance, some because 
that is where the limelight is shining.  The proliferation of more and more 
players, while perhaps creating healthy competition, is also likely to add 
amateurishness where we need more professionalism, to add noise to a 
field that right now may need a bit of quiet time, and to raise the 
possibility of distortions in the microfinance marketplace as players vie for 
the same markets or client territory.  Finally, over-inflated expectations 
make it more likely that in the excitement to do more of what appears to 
be such a good thing, more money will be attracted to microfinance.  
Hence the chances of some harm being done—collateral damage, if you 
like—become greater, if only because there are absorptive capacity limits 
on both the part of lenders and borrowers (despite a statistical basis for 
concluding that there exists huge unmet ‘demand,’ it remains to be seen 
whether or not that demand is ‘effective demand’).  (Dichter, Introduction 
2) 
 
The “self-satisfaction” he has described has certainly not arisen without 
cause, but results from highly-publicized anecdotal evidence and a multitude of 
academic analyses like those aforementioned.  While a body of research has 
identified many of the benefits microfinance promises, independent and objective 
evaluations of development programs are always difficult to carry out, and the 
new fad of “impact evaluations” exacerbates the problem.  This method of 
evaluation, now used by the World Bank, simply compares the impact of a 
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microfinance program with the hypothetical absence of a program (Ellerman 158-
159).  Clearly, this type of analysis will most often lead to positive conclusions  
Additionally, a small but growing collection of literature marked by 
skepticism has emerged, some of which revisits a few of the most widely 
publicized studies of the past, casting doubt on their academic validity.  For 
example, David Roodman and Morduch published a paper in June 2009 that 
analyzed some of the most celebrated studies on the impact of microcredit in 
Bangladesh.  Based on their own interpretation of the data, they found that the 
published benefits were overstated (Morduch and Roodman, The Impact of 
Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh).67
  In a seminal study by Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Rachel 
Glennerster, and Cynthia Kinnan, undertaken in conjunction with the MIT 
Department of Economics, the authors carried out what was the first randomized 
evaluation of the impact of introducing microcredit in a new market.  They looked 
   
                                                            
67 Two of the studies they looked at were published by World Bank economist Khandker and one 
was written by Khandker and Mark Pitt.  Morduch and Roodman noted that Pitt and Khandker 
“apply a quasi-experimental design to 1991-92 data,” which concluded that microcredit raises 
household consumption, especially when provided for women. In another 2005 paper, Khandker 
concluded that microcredit helps the extremely poor even more than the moderately poor (though 
a significant body of research concludes the opposite). Morduch and Roodman analyzed the data 
and used more simple estimators; they found no impact on the level of consumption in the 1991-
92 data and questioned the assumptions made by Pitt and Khandker. Morduch and Roodman did 
find evidence that microcredit reduced consumption volatility, however, the authors noted that the 
(seemingly obvious) association between microcredit and household spending may simply 
indicate that richer families borrow more, not that borrowing leads to improved income (Morduch 
and Roodman). In an earlier, similarly-themed 1999 paper, Morduch wrote that “The most 
important potential impacts are…associated with the reduction of vulnerability, not of poverty per 
se” (Morduch, Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? np). Pitt published an extensive response 
disputing these assertions (Pitt). 
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at half of the 104 slums in Hyderabad, India68
The authors concluded their report by saying that, “While microcredit 
“succeeds” in affecting household expenditure and creating and expanding 
businesses, it appears to have no discernible effect on education, health, or 
women’s empowerment [though they noted that after a while the impact of 
microcredit may translate into higher expenditures, improving these indicators]… 
Microcredit therefore may not be the “miracle” that is sometimes claimed on its 
behalf, but it does allow households to borrow, invest, and create and expand 
businesses” (Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster 21).
 to see the effects of microfinance 
using the group lending model, focusing on areas where microfinance was 
introduced, and 15-18 months later making comparisons with areas without a 
significant microfinance presence.  They surveyed a total of 6,850 households and 
looked at claims that microfinance does things like improve consumption, foster 
new business creation and enhance business income, and improve measures such 
as education, health, and women’s empowerment.   
69
                                                            
68 Hyderabad is the fifth largest city in India and the capital of Andhra Pradesh, the Indian state 
where microcredit has expanded the fastest (Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster 3). 
       
69 They found that microcredit had important effects on business outcomes and the composition of 
household expenditure, noting that existing entrepreneurs used their loans to expand their 
business, and business profits increased. For household that did not already have a business when 
the program began, they did not increase durables spending, but increased nondurable 
consumption, such as food (meaning they probably used microcredit to pay down more expensive 
debt or borrow against future income). Meanwhile, households likely to start a business reduced 
nondurable spending and cut back on goods such as alcohol, tobacco, or lottery tickets. They 
noted that “the segment of the population that increased its consumption when it got the loan 
without starting a business may eventually become poorer because it is borrowing against its 
future, though it is possible that they are just enjoying the “income effect” of having paid down 
their debt to the money-lender (in which case they would be richer and perhaps continue to be 
richer in the future)” (Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster 21).   
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Limitations 
While it has certainly been shown that there are an abundance of cases in 
which microfinance has had a positive impact on the lives of the poor, and most 
published findings are impressive, it is important to take into account the 
numerous failures of past development initiatives, especially those that were 
based on successful experiences and academic support, then replicated identically 
elsewhere, unsuccessfully.  It seems that based on the positive early findings 
found to be associated with microfinance in Bangladesh, the strategy was 
replicated elsewhere almost wholesale, even though the reasons for poverty can 
be unique in various locations.  Past mistakes of overconfidence need to be 
avoided, which means retaining a sense of skepticism about the possibilities for 
microfinance.   
Amidst Yunus’ Nobel Prize, his best-selling book, and all the other 
sensation surrounding microfinance, it can be difficult not to get caught up in the 
celebratory ambiance and to overestimate the promise of microfinance.70  It is 
important to understand that this strategy is not “the cure” for poverty,71
                                                            
70 An overly sentimental video available on Youtube, by The Green Children, praises 
microfinance in Bangladesh, with lyrics such as “she’s got a chance to make it on her own,” “the 
power of choice,” and “she finally broke the spell [of poverty]” (The Green Children, Hear Me 
Now).   
 and in 
71 For example, a FINCA campaign propelled by the star power of Natalie Portman, promoted on 
PBS, “The View,” and MySpace, suggests that, by loaning money to entrepreneurs in the 
developing world, just a click of the mouse can end poverty. Using the FINCA “Village Bank 
Donation Calculator,” a $50 loan is said to “improve” 15 lives in one year, 45 in three years, and 
75 in five years (FINCA Village Bank Donation Calculator). In an interview available on the 
MySpace campaign page, Portman stated, “I have seen that ending poverty is possible-it is just a 
mouse click away” (FINCA The Village Banking Campaign). 
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many places may not be the most effective strategy to combat it.  Rather, it is a 
small but important piece of the development puzzle.   
The microfinance success stories promoted to the public, recounting tales 
of poor women living in abject poverty that are able to grow their business and 
eventually do things like add rooms to their houses, send their children to school 
for the first time, and employ multiple workers, are by far the exception.  Ricardo 
Bebczuk warned that, “Despite the impressive progress of microfinance in recent 
years, stakeholders should avoid over-optimism, rooted in an apparent over-
advertisement of a few successful cases” (Bebczuk 1).  While recipients of 
microcredit can sometimes achieve quick gains, most microentrepreneurs, 
especially own-account workers, continue to scrape by, plagued by the lack of 
basic changes that are needed for broader business development and economic 
and social progress, in areas such as education, health, infrastructure, the 
regulatory environment, and the elimination of corruption.  
Lamentably, microfinance has not shown itself to be an effective tool for 
economic development as promised.  Perhaps the most vociferous critic of 
microfinance is Milford Bateman.  Bateman has argued that microfinance does 
not empower anyone, men or women.  Rather, he believes it disempowers them 
by leaving them vulnerable to market forces.  He has convincingly argued that 
microfinance supports the ideological underpinnings of neoliberal design, stating 
that microfinance serves to “discredit state and collective intervention strategies 
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and to increasingly recast community development and survival solely in terms of 
individual entrepreneurship” (Bateman, De-industrialization and social 
disintegration in Bosnia 207).  In a damning article co-authored with Ha-Joon 
Chang, he wrote that “the current driver to establish the central role of 
microfinance in the development policy cannot be divorced from its supreme 
serviceability to the neoliberal/globalisation agenda” (Bateman and Chang 1).   
Neoliberalism and the unfettered form of capitalism in which everything is 
left to the free market has already proven it is not a proper solution to poverty or 
underdevelopment, manifested in the failure of the Washington Consensus and 
resulting economic meltdowns in Asia and Latin America, in addition to the lack 
of regulation that precipitated the global economic crisis that began in 2008.  
Development policy should not, once again, rely too much on a framework that 
utilizes the market to dictate the best solution.   
 
Microcredit use 
A very important issue that should be raised is the paucity of empirical 
evidence as to how microcredit is actually spent.  Researchers have acknowledged 
that it is extremely difficult to track the flow of money, and simply asking 
someone where their money was spent usually does not provide an accurate 
account.  Data attained in the field, in which researchers observe firsthand how 
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microcredit is spent, is almost nonexistent.72  Formal financial institutions 
typically like to know where their loan money will be spent, and usually require it 
to go towards a specific purpose.  It isn’t unreasonable for MFIs to do the same.73
It is well known that microfinance leads to “consumption smoothing,” in 
which the borrower is able to (sometimes surreptitiously) use their loan to pay for 
things such as emergencies, health care, clothing, or occasional “luxury items” 
such as radios or TVs.  Consumption smoothing is generally regarded as being a 
very positive benefit associated with microfinance, especially for the self-
employed whose incomes fluctuate throughout the year.  A growing body of 
evidence suggests that perhaps most microcredit is actually spent on consumption 
smoothing, not business expenses.   
   
In Paraguay, for example, street vendors report that earnings drop, 
sometimes significantly, during the hot summer months.  Loans offered by MFIs 
can serve to bridge these expected and sometimes unexpected fluctuations in 
earnings, meaning microentrepreneurs are still able to provide for their families 
during rough times.  Consumption smoothing demonstrates that many 
                                                            
72 The 2009 book Portfolios of the Poor, by Morduch, Stuart Rutherford, and Orlanda Ruthven, is 
the first study of its kind, in which researchers followed 250 poor individuals for a year in order to 
document their handling of finances. In a chapter that documented Grameen clients, they reported 
that the loans were used for productive purposes, and more than half of the clients reported that 
they used loans for daily needs like food, medicine, education, and paying off more expensive 
loans (Morduch, Debunking the microfinance bubble). 
73 In Bangladesh, CARE discussions with a wide spectrum of clients suggested that not more than 
50 percent of microloans were being productively used in an activity that would produce earnings 
(Rahman 193).     
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microfinance clients do not take out loans to expand their business; they take out 
loans because their business does not provide them with sufficient income to 
cover their basic necessities, or indulge occasionally in “luxury items.”  For these 
individuals, savings would be the preferable service to offer.   
The growing realization that a significant portion of microcredit, if not 
most, goes almost entirely towards consumption smoothing and not business 
enhancement, is in line with what was witnessed in Paraguay.  Loan officials for 
FP interview clients and ask for a basic explanation of how the loan will be spent, 
but do not follow up on the use of the credit.74
Upon relaying this observation to the credit official, the business-related 
intention of the loan to purchase inventory was repeated, the manager signed off 
on the loan, and the money was issued later that week.  While it is difficult to 
  While some purchase receipts are 
kept in client files, this documentation is sporadic.  One client in San Lorenzo 
stated that she would use her $1,100 loan to purchase inventory for her small 
store.  However, taking a look around her store, it was evident that this loan 
amount was far larger than she needed to replenish her inventory, even several 
times over.  The goods sold in her microenterprise consisted entirely of simple 
products of low quality, such as plastic cups, pens and pencils, paper plates, and 
napkins.  And her purported goal was not to expand the products offered, but 
replenish this inventory.   
                                                            
74 While the CME and rural lending programs provide credit to launch new business ventures, 
individual lending requires a business to already have been established.  
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imagine how this sum could be spent on low-cost products, the “success” of each 
branch was based on the amount lent (in addition to repayment rates), and credit 
officials are remunerated by a commission structure that rewards by loan size and 
quantity of loans dispersed.75
Without doubt, microfinance has encouraged the poor in the developing 
world to borrow.
   
76  In parts of some developing countries, the roads are peppered 
with billboards advertising the services of MFIs, and MFI advertisements pilfer 
the radio waves, encouraging people to take their lives into their own hands by 
becoming entrepreneurs, or buying that television they have always wanted.  
What is most troublesome about this is that both types of borrowing are often 
equated with microfinance as a poverty fighting tool, which consumer credit is 
not.  While consumer loans are certainly in demand, consumer-based 
microfinance is a far cry from the idea of microfinance trumpeted by Yunus and 
others, and will have little or no discernible effect on decreasing poverty.77
 
 
 
                                                            
75 FP implemented a new commission structure in July 2008 that was meant to transform the 
incentives of credit officials so that the poor would be better targeted. The new commission 
structure induced great concern in the San Lorenzo office, and led several credit officials to seek 
employment at competing commercial MFIs that reportedly offered greater earning opportunities. 
76 There have been increasing reports of clients using a loan from one microcredit program to pay 
back a loan from another program, or even worse, seeking funds from a moneylender to repay a 
microloan in order to ensure a steady stream of microcredit. In some countries, “double-dipping,” 
wherein a microloan recipient receives a loan from multiple MFIs, can be upwards of 50 percent 
of clients or more. There have even been instances of borrowers taking out microloans to lend to 
others at higher rates of interest (Rahman 199-200). 
77 As of early 2010 there were no widely published studies on the possibility of consumer 
microloans actually increasing any indicators of poverty.   
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What about savings? 
In the rush to provide credit to the poor and increase the number of clients 
served, it seems that savings for the poor have often been neglected.  In reality, 
savings are the financial service most demanded by the poor, which is clearly 
indicated by the strong evidence showing that consumption smoothing is the most 
useful financial benefit tied to microfinance.  Most banking services aimed at 
individuals find that demand for savings accounts is much greater than for loan 
accounts.  However, in the microfinance industry, counter intuitively, in order to 
borrow, one must also save.  Most MFIs focus only on disbursing loans, while 
services for savings are designed not to meet the poor’s need for savings, but to 
provide collateral for loans and supply low cost capital (Hulme 20).78
 Littlefield remarked, “There is lots of evidence suggesting that poor 
people would rather save, turning small amounts into a lump sum, rather than 
borrow a lump sum and then pay it back, but the only way you can offer a safe 
place to save money is if you have sound, government-licensed, well-governed 
institutions.  And that is what commercialization really means” (Hartford np).  
Some non-profit MFIs require borrowers to save, but mechanisms are often 
informal because they cannot legally allowed take deposits.  FP requires that 
CME members establish a collective savings account, but this must be done with 
   
                                                            
78 In some poverty-stricken parts of the world, the poor actually pay people to look after their 
deposits. In West Africa, for example, some people pay susu collectors a fee equaling a 40 percent 
annual interest rate simply for looking after their deposits (The Economist, Smooth Operators np). 
A study carried out in Uganda revealed that people with access to formal savings in banks saved 
three times as much as those without such access. (Helms 25) 
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an outside institution because the FP structure does not allow them to offer this 
service.  The commercial competitors that offer savings accounts for individuals 
require a minimum of several hundred dollars or more to open an account, which 
is out of reach for most of the poor. 
As Littlefield has explained, the push for commercialization is initiating 
changes in banking regulations that allow MFIs to collect savings.  Unfortunately, 
in most countries NGO MFIs are still not allowed to accept deposits.  Under the 
right circumstances, collecting savings from the poor could enable societies to 
make a collective leap forward; almost every country in modern history that has 
achieved progress on a significant scale has done so by utilizing savings, not by 
borrowing (Dichter, The chicken and egg dilemma et al.).79
 
 
Commercialized microfinance 
Microfinance is currently in the process of going through some profound 
changes.  What initially began as a grassroots development tool is becoming a 
commercial operation; this has become the most heated and continuous debate 
related to microfinance.  The reality that microfinance operations are “trickling 
                                                            
79 Bateman and Chang have pointed out that, compared to its neighboring South and East Asian 
countries, Bangladesh has been one of the least successful at reducing poverty and encouraging 
“bottom up” productive enterprise developent. They argue that, while the successful countries 
recycled domestic savings into larger, more sophisticated, technology-intensive, innovation-
driven, and therefore growth-oriented enterprises, Bangladesh invested it (and international aid) 
into unsustainable informal sector microenterprises such as rickshaws, kiosks, traders, food stands, 
and street vendors. They attest that this perpetuates Bangladesh’s reliance on FDI and government 
spending on large investments (Bateman and Chang 12-13). 
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up” into the commercial sector produces numerous concerns and considerations 
that must be taken into account when moving forward.   
The following section will discuss several of the themes most often 
discussed in regards to commercialization.  These include interest rates and MFI 
profits (and the possibility of exploitation), the ability to collect savings, for-profit 
versus non-profit, and consumer loans versus small business loans.  The way 
these issues are handled will be crucial for the progression of microfinance and its 
ability to continue to benefit the world’s poor. 
Sometimes NGOs commercialize, or “scale up,” with the intention of 
improving sustainability and outreach and being able to offer services like 
savings, in addition to being able to make a profit.  Most often, it is said to be 
done for a combination of these reasons.  Additionally, commercial banks are 
quickly entering the microfinance market by “scaling down,” and many are 
making substantial profits while doing so.   
People worry about the possibility that “mission drift” may be occurring, 
whereby the original poverty-related problems microfinance was developed to 
combat are set aside in the run for profit.  Mission drift might entail MFIs 
charging “market” interest rates that will exploit the poor, because they have no 
other credit options, and/or that MFIs will no longer target their services towards 
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the poorest individuals, especially as the needs of investors become more 
important.80
Others argue that commercialization is necessary for the industry to reach 
more people.  According to this argument, MFI NGOs that are not financially 
self-sustaining are prone to waste money and importantly, may not be able to 
assist the poor at all if their donor funds dry up (though both commercial and 
philanthropic funds are affected by the health of the economy).  Additionally, 
microfinance as practiced by NGOs may compete for funds with development 
projects in other areas.  Aside from these concerns, it is certain that many MFIs 
are constrained by a lack of capital.
   
81
Several studies have provided evidence for the case that MFIs do not do as 
much to target the poor when focusing on sustainability or profit.  A body of 
existing literature demonstrates that most MFIs, especially the most financially 
efficient, tend to target the moderately poor and those who live in urban areas.  
Robert Cull, Asli Demirguo-Kunt, and Morduch analyzed data on 124 MFIs in 49 
countries and found that there is a possibility of earning profits while serving the 
   
                                                            
80 A 2005 survey by CGAP estimated that less than a quarter of the total MFI funding that has 
come from foreign institutions in recent years is most interested in earning a market rate of return 
(Callaghan, Gonzalez and Maurice 118). Littlefield pointed out that "with daily headlines 
trumpeting big investors seeking huge profits in microfinance, it is tempting to believe that this 
investment boom is about mainstream investors coming into the sector looking for purely financial 
returns. In fact, most investment in microfinance today involves a social motivation alongside a 
financial motivation.  Since social mission is at the core of microfinance, there is a natural fit with 
socially motivated investors" (PR Newswire np). 
81 Most respondents of a survey conducted by CGAP and MIX perceived funding to be the biggest 
constraint to growth. In some of the few situations where financing was not a restraint, growth 
rates of 50 percent to 100 percent were experienced (Meehan 1,5). 
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poor, but a trade-off emerges between profitability and serving the poorest.  Their 
results were somewhat mixed, but they did conclude that as larger and older MFIs 
mature and grow, they focus increasingly on clients that can absorb larger loans.  
This seemingly demonstrates that these MFIs are not targeting the poorest of the 
poor, but the authors noted that it remains unclear whether or not their expansion 
had led them to target borrowers from a wider range of economic means, or 
whether return borrowers sought out larger loans as their businesses became 
profitable.  Overall, they concluded that there are examples of MFIs that have 
managed to achieve profitability together with significant outreach to the poor, 
but they are the exceptions (Cull, Demirguo-Kunt and Morduch 31).82
Between 2000 and 2006, Mersland and Strom studied MFIs of various 
structures, looking at NGOs and shareholder-owned firms (SHFs), including 
banks and non-bank financial institutions.  While it is generally argued that NGO 
MFIs should commercialize in order to improve efficiency, which will ensure 
sustainability and improve outreach, the authors’ findings indicated that the 
difference between shareholder owned MFIs and non-government MFIs is 
minimal, which contradicts established beliefs and policy guidelines in the 
industry (Mersland and Strom 598).   
   
                                                            
82 According to a World Bank publication, their experience with CGAP’s Poverty Assessment 
Tool demonstrates the fact that those MFIs that attempt to reach very poor people tend to succeed 
(Helms 20). 
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They found that NGOs are not more socially oriented than SHFs, nor are 
SHFs more profit-oriented than NGOs.  SHF’s superiority in scale and scope do 
not seem to be related to ownership type, but to the legal constraints which 
impede most NGOs from mobilizing savings (Mersland and Strom 599).  Many 
microfinance policy reports highlight the strengths of SHFs and weaknesses of 
NGOs, in particularly emphasizing that NGOs are less commercial and 
professional because they lack owners with financial incentive to monitor 
management.  “The implicit message is that SHFs benefit from better governance, 
can access more funding and thus perform better than NGOs” (Mersland and 
Strom 600).  An alternative hypothesis provided by the authors is that SHFs and 
NGOs do not perform differently because they may use the same business model 
to compete and serve customers in the market.   
Mersland and Strom pointed out that different ownership forms are 
actually common in the banking and insurance industries, and in mature bank-
markets where different ownership types co-exist, researchers find little evidence 
to suggest that ownership type influences operational efficiency.  The authors 
noted that agency theory83
                                                            
83 Agency theory basically involves the costs of resolving conflicts between principals and agents 
and aligning the interests of the two groups. 
 predicts that non-profit organizations can have an 
offsetting benefit of reducing customer adverse selection and moral hazard, since 
they may be closer to the customers and better able to tap into local information 
networks.  For clients with low levels of education, this makes sense, as the 
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relationships with depositors and borrowers are as important to the success of the 
bank as the manager’s and the board’s relationship with its owners (Mersland and 
Strom 600).  The authors concluded that the theories do not bring clear 
predictions regarding the efficiency of different ownership types in microfinance 
markets.  They believe the adaption of a legal framework that allows well-
performing NGOs to mobilize saving appears to be a better option than 
transformation to a commercial structure. 
 
Compartamos 
The most notorious example used to rally against commercialization and 
to support claims of exploitation of the poor is that of Mexico’s Compartamos.  
Compartamos began in 1990 as a non-profit MFI, and after experiencing growth, 
and in order to fulfill a desire to improve outreach, in 2000 the organization 
converted into a commercial-structured, for-profit MFI.  The original shareholders 
of ACCION,84 the International Finance Corporation (IFC),85
Compartamos added more than 100,000 net new clients in both 2005 and 
2006, totaling a compound annual growth rate of 46 percent in terms of clients 
and 60 percent in terms of portfolio between 2001 and 2006 (Acción 4).  In 2006 
Compartamos became a full-fledged commercial bank, and by April, 2007 had 
 and private 
Mexican investors initially invested $6 million in the MFI (Acción 3).   
                                                            
84 ACCION is partly funded by USAID. 
85 The IFC is the World Bank’s private sector lending operation. 
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become the first Latin American MFI to carry out an initial public offering (IPO), 
selling 29.9 percent of its stock as a secondary offering on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange.86  On just the first day of trading the price rose 32.3 percent, and after 
two weeks reached 49.8 percent above the initial offering price (Acción 9).87
A 2007 study by CGAP estimated that 23.6 percent of Compartamos’ 
interest income went to profit, while its return on average equity was more than 
triple the 15 percent average for Mexican commercial banks (Malkin np).  CGAP 
estimated that the average return on assets for self-sufficient organizations is 5.5 
percent, while for Compartamos, this number reached 19.6 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 (Malkin np).  According to Mix data, by the end of 2009 
Compartamos had a gross loan portfolio of over $577 million, with over 1.5 
million active borrowers.     
  The 
early investment of $6 million came to be worth about $1.5 billion after this sale 
(Acción 1,8).  Compartamos earned $80 million in profit in 2007, and their 
portfolio grew to over $400 million.  Since going public, return on equity has 
been more than 40 percent (Malkin np).   
 
                                                            
86 A secondary offering is the sale of existing shares rather than issuing new shares, so no fresh 
capital was funneled into Compartamos as a result of the sale. Raising new equity was not a need 
in early 2007, as Compartamos had other means of financing growth (Acción 6). 
87 Just over half the investors were from the U.S., and Mexican investors made up only 5 percent 
(Acción 9). As of mid-October 2009, the stock had declined about 30 percent since the IPO, but 
was still performing exceptionally well in comparison to other banks. 
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Although financial outreach to the poor in Mexico undoubtedly increased, 
contention continues to accompany the enormous profits Compartamos earns.  
Most of the criticism comes from the fact that interest rates have remained high, 
averaging almost 90 percent annually (including 15 percent in government tax), 
even though costs fell and efficiency improved (Malkin np).  Critics argue that the 
bank has essentially carried on the usurious interest rates of the moneylenders that 
microfinance was originally intended to replace.  In much of the world, 
microfinance interest rates range from 25 to 45 percent.  In Mexico, rates are said 
to be higher due to reasons such as inefficiency and limited competition.    
Numerous detractors, including Yunus, consider profits earned by MFIs 
such as Compartamos to be exploitative.  While Yunus acknowledged that “The 
need to constantly raise funds from donors uses up the time and energy of 
nonprofit leaders, when they should be planning the growth and expansion of 
their programs” (Yunus, Creating a World Without Poverty 10-11), he is wholly 
against profiting from the commercialization of microfinance.  In a 2007 
interview with PBS he remarked that, “just because they are willing to pay, I 
don’t think that’s a justification, if you call it microcredit, because microcredit has 
a philosophy. Microcredit has a purpose…to help people get out of 
poverty…Some people are saying that Compartamos is the future.  I always say 
that Compartamos is the past…I hope that this will disappear very soon”(PBS 
Now).  He has also been quoted as saying, in regards to Compartamos, “I don’t 
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want to associate with you, I want to battle with you and to fight you” (Hartford 
np).88
Meanwhile, members of Compartamos and other supporters claim that the 
intention has been to improve outreach to the poor, which has been accomplished; 
they see nothing wrong with making a profit while doing so.  Alvaro Rodriguez
   
89
Organizations such as Compartamos, which focus on consumer loans, 
must be differentiated from traditional MFIs, which typically offer microcredit to 
fund microenterprise.  Though various services may fall under the guise of 
“microfinance,” the services offered by Compartamos are quite different than 
 
claimed a desire to “…show the world that investing in the poor was a profitable 
venture, and that with a successful IPO we would attract funding from 
commercial sources to help the fight against poverty” (Acción 6).  Furthermore, 
interest rates charged by Compartamos are in line with the rates charged by 
several of their competitors, and the number of small loans (under $1,000) they 
provided is far greater than other commercialized banks in Latin America (Berger, 
Goldmark and Miller-Sanabria 55).  Despite the controversy surrounding 
Compartamos, they are supplying a demand that exists, and customers have 
shown they are willing to pay the high interest rates that accompany the 
microcredit.   
                                                            
88 Morduch commented that, “Yunus is concerned that his legacy, even the language of 
microcredit, is being appropriated.  But the rest of the world doesn’t care and shouldn’t care” 
(Hartford np) 
89 Rodriguez sits on the board of several esteemed organizations, including ACCION, 
Compartamos, Harvard’s David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, and others. 
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those offered by MFIs such as FP.  Compartamos does not have an explicit goal 
of generating employment, or supporting microenterprise, but instead strives to 
offer various financial services for the poor, including consumer loans.  
Furthermore, their innovative techniques, which have been replicated by other 
MFIs, would likely not have been possible under a non-commercial structure.90
An example that may be used to counter criticism levied at 
commercialization is BancoSol of Bolivia, which grew out of PRODEM, a non-
profit organization.  In 1992, with the help of ACCION, BancoSol became the 
first commercial bank in the world dedicated specifically to microfinance, and 
eventually became one of Bolivia’s most successful banking institutions.  In 1997 
it became the world’s first MFI to issue dividends to shareholders (Helms 52).     
   
Initially, the organization’s NGO status had limited its growth due to an 
inability to attract capital and collect savings.  Facing these limitations, and given 
their belief that dependency on donors hampered development, a formal bank was 
created (Drake and Otero).91
                                                            
90 In October of 2009, for example, Compartamos applied for a unique license that will allow 
small local stores in rural villages to accept deposits and make loans to the bank’s customers 
(Schmall np). 
  At first BancoSol charged a combination of interest 
rates and fees equivalent to a 65 percent annual percentage rate.  Today, with the 
influx of competition and a relatively commercialized environment, BancoSol’s 
91 Early investment in the bank came from Bolivian individuals ($52,500), Bolivian businesses ($1 
million), the Calmeadow Foundation ($406,000), ACCION International ($250,000), ECOS 
Holding (FUNDES group) ($250,000), and PRODEM ($1.4 million) (see Drake and Otero 1995) 
(Buechler et al. 93-94). 
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rates have dropped to around 22 percent (Helms 85), and loans are still being 
made predominantly to poor women in the informal sector (Bhatt and Tang 319).  
While the idea of making profits off the poor is certainly disturbing, and 
by some accounts exploitation may be occurring, commercialization is the most 
effective way to improve financial access for the poor, and as the case of 
BancoSol demonstrates, does not necessarily entail excessive interest rates.  
While commercialization may raise as many questions as it answers, for the most 
part, the commercialization of microfinance is a positive trend, as financial access 
is an important component of development, and savings are especially important, 
and in most countries only available in a commercial or quasi-commercial setting.   
However, detractors will persist, and for valid reasons, the criticism is 
warranted.  Bateman has offered a trenchant analysis of development and the 
commercialization of microfinance: “…development policy cannot be undertaken 
as a commercial operation.  Instead, development costs money to establish, it does 
not make money” (Hechler-Fayd'herbe 4). 
 
Additional concerns 
In some ways microfinance shares certain characteristics with predatory 
lending, such as poor analysis of a borrower’s ability to repay; aggressive 
marketing of high-risk, high-interest loans; promotion of complicated loan 
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products not easily understood by borrowers; the collection of undisclosed 
charges and expensive fees, and payment of illegal kickbacks (Beirne 3).92  
Complicated procedures, in addition to steep interest rates, are characteristics of 
microfinance.93
S.S. Rahman explained that  
  For example, 58 percent of a random sample of Ugandan MFI 
borrowers said that they did not understand all the interest and fees they were 
expected to pay on their current loan, and 35 percent of these borrowers admitted 
that they withheld information about other debts from the lending agency 
(Wilksen Agencies).   
Many NGO MFIs use the flat rate system, which is not easily 
understandable by the clients.  A 15 percent flat rate interest is equivalent 
to about a 30 percent rate on a declining balance system used by banks.  
Not only the clients but even educated people sometimes have trouble 
understanding this system.  The flat rate gives impression of a lower rate 
than it actually is, this is misleading and non-transparent. (Rahman 198)94
                                                            
92 Cecelia Bierne has drawn attention to several commonalities between the growing microfinance 
industry and the early stages of the subprime lending industry: “[1] Expansion of financial 
services to the underserved- in order to provide business opportunities to investors and access to 
funding for clients. [2] An influx of available funding to the markets- to enable rapid growth of 
business, in some cases from overanxious and inexperienced lenders. [3] The prevalence of high 
interest rates- in order to offset the increased risk in subprime markets and to cover operating 
expenses in microfinance markets. [4] Appearance of innovative new products- in order to 
facilitate market penetration, which is broadly adapted in spite of limited data on effectiveness. [5] 
Increased reliance on technology, to facilitate rapid growth, while distancing borrowers from 
lenders” (Beirne 3). 
 
93 At the Clinton Global Initiative in November, 2008, some of the world’s leading MFIs 
announced a collaborative effort to focus their industry on securing fair treatment for clients. This 
Campaign for Client Protection in Microfinance includes several core principles: ensuring that 
microfinance institutions do not engage in reckless or predatory lending; ensuring transparency 
with clients about prices, fees, and terms; treating clients with dignity, even during debt collection; 
keeping client data secure (Rhyne, Standards for Microfinance Growth 11). 
94 Another problem is the fact that usually no loan prepayment is offered, so if a client takes out a 
loan and pays it in its entirety the next day, they still pay interest for the year. 
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 A very serious concern that has arisen in multiple parts of the world is the 
increasingly aggressive loan collection methods used by some credit officials.  
This topic, which is directly related to commercialization and rapid, unrestrained 
growth, has begun to receive considerable attention as of late 2010 due to an 
ongoing situation in India (where some MFIs have grown over several hundred 
percent in just the last few years).  With enormous growth in the region and 
unprecedented competition, loan officials, remunerated by commission, are 
competing against each other for a limited number of clients.   
This has led to increasingly aggressive marketing techniques and a sharply 
rising number of reports of unscrupulous collection methods, including threats 
and even the illegal seizure of property.95
A similar outcry against over-indebtedness and aggressive lending 
practices occurred in Bolivia on July 2, 2001 when an organization of fruit 
vendors, cobblers, and farmers armed with dynamite took the country’s 
  In the southern state of Andhra Pradesh 
where this phenomenon has erupted into a full-fledged crisis, there have been 
numerous suicides linked to borrowers’ inability to pay their microloans.  
Families of the deceased have reported that over-indebtedness and threats from 
credit officials were the cause.  Local political leaders have responded by calling 
for individuals to cease repayment of their loans, and some villages have barred 
MFI employees from entering.   
                                                            
95 There have been periodic reports of similar abuses occurring in other parts of the world, 
including multiple cases in Bangladesh (MicroCapital np). 
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Superintendency of Banks hostage, demanding forgiveness or reduction of the 
debt they had incurred through microlenders.  Elisabeth Rhyne explained that this 
was a result of over-indebtedness caused by a convergence of MFIs and consumer 
lenders as a result of the growth of microfinance in the late 1990s, which occurred 
in the midst of the major recession. She noted that this represented the perilous 
line between commercially-motivated microfinance and benevolently-charged 
microfinance, which employed similar rhetoric and were not differentiated by the 
debtors (Rhyne, Crisis in Bolivian Microfinance 3).96
 
 
Concerns at Fundación Paraguaya 
Even at FP, a non-profit MFI, individual lending rates hover around the 40 
percent range, fluctuating slightly in response to market forces.  While profits are 
reinvested to target poorer clients through the CME program, rural lending, and 
social programs, this interest is above the market rate, and borrowers (and some 
employees) have a hard time understanding why interest rates are so high if profit 
is not the motive.  Some competitors in the Paraguayan microfinance market, 
                                                            
96 There has been a mounting concern about over-indebtedness in Bolivian microfinance. In a late 
2008 issue, MIX’s Microbanking Bulletin explained that the majority of the Bolivian population 
now has access to financial services, and that lending requirements are becoming increasingly 
flexible, while underwriting practices for loans are becoming alarmingly aggressive (Robledo 1). 
Catalina Robledo noted that the Bolivian microfinance sector is at risk for over-indebtedness, 
created by an overabundance of supply. She quipped that “the Bolivian microfinance sector’s 
success is at the source of its biggest risks today” (Robledo 4). It is this rapid and often 
unscrutinized growth, occurring in Bolivia and throughout the world, that led Morduch to predict 
that “there will likely be a big microfinance failure some place, bigger than what we have seen to 
date” (The Economist, Froth at the bottom np). 
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namely credit unions, offer much lower interest rates on loans.  Unfortunately, 
they often require savings of at least several hundred dollars to establish an 
account, and underwriting practices are more stringent, leaving the poor with few 
other borrowing options.  The fact that MFIs such as FP step in to offer these 
services to those otherwise considered un-bankable is a positive thing, even if 
rates are high. 
Another point of concern is that FP receives funding through Kiva, an 
innovative internet site that allows individuals to lend money to 
microentrepreneurs across the world with just the click of a mouse and a debit or 
credit card.  With funding from Kiva (and other sources), it is difficult to explain 
40 percent interest rates.  Part of the way FP receives the funding is by 
designating specific borrowers as Kiva entrepreneurs.  These individuals have 
their pictures taken and stories recounted on the Kiva website.  This is usually 
done without detailed explanation to the entrepreneur of what Kiva is and how 
their photograph will be used.  Additionally, Kiva advertises to donors the ability 
to choose a specific entrepreneur in whom to invest, while in reality the funds are 
provided to FP in a lump sum, not designated for specific entrepreneurs.    
Admittedly, the Kiva project would not work if borrowers had to wait on 
individual foreign donors to deem their business venture creditworthy.  However, 
the way Kiva presents the system is very misleading; it actually provides a figure 
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that is meant to show how much more money the entrepreneur needs donated to 
receive their loan (Kiva has been working on improving transparency). 
 
Microenterprise efficiency in Paraguay 
 Upon speaking with FP’s credit officials and clients, and spending time 
scouring the profiles FP keeps on its clients (carpetas), it became apparent early 
on that many, if not the majority of microentrepreneurs in Paraguay, are engaging 
in businesses practices that are costly and inefficient, usually because they have  
no other recourse.  For example, many of FP’s clients simply go to the local 
market, often Mercado de Abasto or Mercado Cuatro, to purchase inputs for their 
business, such as cooking ingredients or fabric, or inventory like clothing or soda 
and snacks.  Many others may go to the local grocery store to purchase items, and 
then resell them on the streets or in their nearby kiosks for a small markup.  
Remarkably, these entrepreneurs sometimes make these trips to purchase 
inventory several times a week, often spending less than $20 at a time.   
This practice is extremely time consuming and inefficient.  Especially 
troubling is the fact that for many vendors, the time spent on the street or in their 
store is directly proportional to their income.  Microcredit is meant to provide 
them with the working capital to purchase larger quantities at a time, but that is 
not how it is usually spent.  Even with the availability of credit, 
microentrepreneurs continue to be risk averse.  The cost of innovation is simply 
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too high; if a new business model or product does not work out, the result could 
be that a family does not eat. 
 Microcredit may be reinforcing and perpetuating inefficient business 
models that only keep microenterprises on the margins of survival.  The majority 
of FP’s clients are reliant on their loans for replenishing inventory and purchasing 
inputs, while paying interest rates around 20 or 40 percent, depending on the 
program.  Consistently relying on high-interest credit to operate a business is not 
efficient.  Microcredit may get the business’ wheels turning, but very rarely at a 
quick enough pace for the entrepreneur to substantially expand his or her 
business, move up the economic ladder, and contribute significantly to the local 
and national economy.   
Many of these microentrepreneurs never reach the point where they are 
able to take advantage of economies of scale.  While stories of growth are widely 
publicized, lacking in the anecdotal evidence is the entrepreneur who starts a 
small business, saves enough capital to expand to another location, and another, 
eventually coming to operate a chain of enterprises with multiple employees.  
Instead, there are a number of FP entrepreneurs that actually operate two or three 
small businesses, working grueling hours to provide for the families.  
Even the credit officials working at FP acknowledge that most of their 
clients operate microenterprises to sobrevivir, or survive, and do not entertain 
serious hopes for the type of significant expansion and growth that is possible in 
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developed countries where more favorable conditions exist.  While the 
organization’s mission and objective are to combat poverty and support informal 
sector entrepreneurialism, at least a few of their employees maintain that profit is 
equally, if not more important.  Their beliefs, though possibly erroneous, and 
probably related to the necessary focus on sustainability, are substantiated by the 
commission structure, which, as of the early part of the summer of 2008, was 
based mainly on the number and size of loans, in addition to repayment rates.  
Within the organization, there seems to be a disconnect between the main office, 
whose employees tout poverty-fighting ideals and the empowering philosophy 
behind microfinance, and many of the credit officials actually working on the 
ground, who are motivated by commission for bringing revenue to the 
organization (as previously noted, the commission structure has since changed, 
and is structured to place more emphasis on impact). 
Even if a microenterprise were to overcome the many obstacles 
characteristic of Paraguay’s business environment, and grow substantially, in 
many cases it would be limited in its contribution to the local economy.  Many of 
Paraguay’s microentrepreneurs purchase imported goods, which they then resell 
in their respective kiosks.  These goods are often purchased in, or originate from, 
Ciudad del Este, one of the world’s largest smuggling points for goods.  If the 
goods microentrepreneurs sell are simply smuggled from the more developed 
nations of Argentina and Brazil, then resold, without paying any type of taxes, 
this does little more than poverty alleviation on an individual scale, or simply 
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helps people trying to “sobrevivir.”  While this improvement in opportunity in the 
lives of individuals is important, no macroeconomic progress is being made, nor 
is progress being made towards a sustainable solution to poverty.     
A central element of microcredit that lends credence to those skeptical of 
microfinance’s ability to lead to sustainable and significant economic 
development, as highlighted by Timothy Nourse, stems from the fact that 
microcredit does not necessarily increase productivity.  Instead, when not spent 
on the use of technology or capital inputs, microcredit serves to increase the use 
of available labor.  This “means that informal businesses in microfinance 
programs initially experience high returns to their investments, but these returns 
then decrease and businesses continue to record low productivity levels” (Nourse 
65).  Nourse used the example of an MFI client that produces milk.  This 
microentrepreneur would be more likely to invest in additional animals, which 
requires additional labor, rather than invest in milk-processing devices that may 
save time and increase labor productivity.  These investments yield diminishing 
returns as labor productivity is maximized.  “As a result, although microfinance 
has helped businesses to grow or expand, it has not increased their productivity or 
returns” (Nourse 65).   
If countries want to really set themselves up for economic progress on a 
significant scale, and microfinance is to play a part, strategies that increase 
productivity and returns on labor need to be implemented.  Most use of 
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microcredit, assuming it is spent on business purposes and not household 
consumption, is spent on inventory or other inputs that don’t necessarily induce 
productivity gains.  Furthermore, especially in Paraguay, microenterprise 
productivity is limited by deficient legal and regulatory regimes and lacking or 
non-existent infrastructure and public services.  While microfinance may lead to 
improvements in individual lives, in the current environment, in Paraguay and in 
most countries, microfinance is not a viable method for considerable, sustainable 
economic growth.   
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CONCLUSION 
In spite of the hope inspired by impressive success stories and quickly 
spreading popularity, microfinance is not the “elusive elixir” economists have 
been searching for.  Microfinance has been a relatively effective strategy for 
assuaging the effects of macroeconomic crisis and globalization, particularly the 
resulting shortage of quality jobs and the increased need for microcredit.  By 
itself, microfinance is not an effective tool to sustainably combat poverty on an 
aggregate, national scale, and will not increase macroeconomic growth.  
Providing liquidity to the poor does, however, provide some measure of relief 
from poverty for many of the world’s poor who lack access to financial services.  
Microfinance is especially effective when it is connected with social programs.   
  The microfinance movement currently stands at a crossroads.  The results 
produced by microfinance and the way it should be implemented are increasingly 
coming into question.  Within the next few years, a more definitive answer on 
microfinance and its actual potential for progress, in Paraguay and in the rest of 
the world, should become available.  Although microfinance is one of the more 
successful tools devised for development to date, and the services provided by 
MFIs are in high demand, it cannot live up to its promise as advertised by its 
strongest proponents.  The microfinance marvel has been exaggerated; the reality 
is that, in addition to concerns directly related to microfinance, there are simply 
too many other problems that must first be solved before microfinance can play a 
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part in banishing poverty to museums, as Yunus so often mentions.97
Microfinance is only a piece of the strategy for sustainable social and 
economic progress that can hope to wipe poverty from the globe.  Microfinance 
has largely achieved its current level of importance due to the spillover effects of 
economic change and the transformation of the labor environment, which drew 
increased attention to the informal economy.  While microfinance may fall short 
of its hype, and lingering concerns remain, it certainly can play an important part 
in abating poverty, and when combined with other measures, can be an effective 
tool to improve lives.  However, the current focus on this particular strategy is 
overdone, as other initiatives that focus on the roots of poverty are at least as 
important.   
  Among 
many other reasons, microfinance will not lead to sustainable economic growth 
because there are so many obstacles to success faced by microenterprises in 
developing countries, and in reality microcredit is not consistently used for 
productive business purposes.   
 
A climate for microfinance 
The past couple decades witnessed an enormous rise in the popularity of 
microfinance, with MFIs throughout the world spreading and growing at a 
                                                            
97 Yunus has set a date of 2030 for the creation of a “poverty museum.” He believes that by then, 
not a single Bangladeshi will live in poverty (Tharoor et al.). 
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phenomenally rapid pace.  In Latin America the popularity of microfinance spread 
especially quickly after the debt crisis and subsequent neoliberal reforms, which 
forced scores of individuals into unemployment and underemployment.  When 
these displaced workers were unable to find decent work, many of them turned to 
the informal economy, often in the form of self-employment, which all but 
institutionalized informality.  In Paraguay the causes were somewhat unique, but 
the effects were essentially the same.   
While microfinance is a strategy that has been, for the most part, 
underutilized for many years, its importance and surging popularity is closely 
linked to steady or rising levels of informality in the economies of developing 
counties.  Microfinance has been an especially important service for the self-
employed who operate informally, many of whom fall into the category of own-
account workers.  While the flexibility offered by self-employment is beneficial 
for some, others are self-employed not because of their “entrepreneurial spirit,” or 
because it is financially lucrative, but because they have little other choice.  This 
is especially true for those with little education and few skills suited for work in 
the modern economy.    
For most, especially in countries with labor environments similar to 
Paraguay’s, microcredit is useful as a coping mechanism, but not necessarily a 
veritable way out of poverty.  In large part due to the unavailability of social 
safety nets in developing countries, particularly for those employed informally, 
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microfinance has been demonstrated to be especially effective in its ability to 
reduce vulnerability.  Many of the clients served by MFIs across the world, and 
especially in Paraguay, are own-account workers and do not belong to the 
“entrepreneurial class.”  These vulnerable individuals work in highly competitive 
markets and are faced with unpredictable and often meager income.  While for 
most in the developing world, turning to self-employment or own-account work is 
not a stepping stone into prosperity, it does allow the individual to provide for his 
or her family, which makes the services of MFIs important.   
However, self-employment as encouraged by the microfinance movement 
possesses limited potential for the type of macroeconomic growth that can lift 
populations out of poverty.  In spite of its explosive popularity, even some of the 
most ardent supporters of microfinance admit there is little potential for it to 
engender measurable economic improvement on a national scale.  It may even be 
that in some cases, including Paraguay, MFIs actually reinforce the culture of 
informal self-employment, legitimizing a system in dire need of change.   
 
Uncertain prospects 
Microcredit for the poor, excluding consumer loans, has at times achieved 
demonstrable success in alleviating poverty.  However, while financial services 
treat some of the symptoms of poverty, they are not a tool to eliminate the causes.  
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If poverty is to be eliminated, and if microfinance is to play a part, the many non-
financial factors that contribute to poverty must first be addressed.   
Socially motivated MFIs are making progress in tackling some of the 
problems associated with poverty, particularly in areas of health, education, and 
gender relations, but are only a small part of the solution.  More so, the extent of 
these benefits is surrounded with uncertainty.  While the potential benefits of 
microfinance have been widely advertised, up until recently, limitations and 
possible drawbacks have rarely been mentioned.   
One of the most important facts about microfinance that needs to be 
acknowledged is that loans are often used for consumption smoothing, and not 
necessarily for productive business purposes.  While this reduces immediate 
vulnerability, this was not the originally intended use for microcredit.  This is a 
reality not usually discussed in the continuing push for microfinance.   
Another point of contention surrounding microfinance is 
commercialization, which is a phenomenon that must be closely scrutinized in 
order to ensure that the best interests of the poor are met.  Many commercial MFIs 
are earning extraordinary profits, by some accounts on the backs of poor 
customers with few sources for credit and little or no access to formal savings.  
These customers often pay interest rates comparable to those charged by the 
moneylenders microcredit is meant to replace.   
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More so, consumer loans are increasingly being offered to the poor, often 
under the guise of “microfinance,” which suggests that this is a service to fight 
poverty, while in reality it is not.  Consumer lending by MFIs is especially 
prevalent in Latin America, and while it increases choice, it has little or no 
discernable effect on reducing poverty.  While commercialization raises many 
questions, it does have its advantages, including increasing outreach, and, most 
importantly, allowing MFIs to offer savings accounts.98
 
    
Areas of potential 
Female empowerment 
 Probably the most important impact microfinance has produced in the 
developing world is a social, not an economic change.  Socially-charged 
microfinance initiatives have shown a strong capability to improve gender 
relations and provide women with the tools to improve their own lives and the 
lives of their families.  The empowerment of women that microfinance programs 
have produced will play a vital role in development efforts.  Meaningful progress 
cannot occur when half the population is left out of the equation.   
 
                                                            
98 At the same time, within a proper regulatory environment, a fully commercialized structure is 
not necessarily required to provide savings. Rather than singularly focusing on commercialization, 
there should be a greater push for flexibility in the type of institutions that can collect savings.   
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Savings and insurance 
One of the greatest benefits of microfinance is its ability to reduce 
vulnerability.  While this is done by offering credit, insurance and savings 
mechanisms are what the poor really need.  It has been repeatedly demonstrated 
that the poor would rather save than borrow, which is evidenced by the fact that 
credit is so often used for consumption smoothing.  Savings reduces vulnerability 
to unexpected expenses while avoiding the high interest rates associated with 
borrowing.  Savings would be especially useful to the poor if anyone could use 
this service, not just borrowers.   
Insurance services are also invaluable instruments to cushion the poor in 
times of hardship.  These types of safety nets that are taken for granted in the 
developed world can play a crucial part in lifting the developing world’s 
population out of poverty (i.e. access to credit, health and life insurance, 
unemployment insurance, pension plans and social security, workman’s 
compensation, etc.).  MFIs can be particularly suitable vessels to supply these 
services in developing countries, especially in the absence of a fully functioning 
government.   
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Rural poverty 
Poverty is especially difficult to combat in rural areas.  Many of the 
world’s poor live a life of financial exclusion, but this is especially the case in 
rural areas.  Mainly due to factors that limit efficiency, penetrating rural markets 
with microfinance has proven to be especially cumbersome, including for FP.  
Fighting rural poverty is an area in which microfinance possesses enormous 
potential.  This is especially true because these individuals stand to benefit the 
most from the social programs offered by MFIs, as services in areas like health 
and education are often inaccessible in rural areas.  A greater push for socially-
charged microfinance in rural areas is important in Paraguay, and the rest of Latin 
America, where the poorest live.  If MFIs are to play a part in meeting these 
needs, it will only be possible with government involvement and philanthropic 
funding.   
 
Push for change 
In its current state, microfinance may perpetuate informality and reinforce 
the underdevelopment related to it.  By offering credit to meet the needs of the 
informally self-employed, MFIs may be inadvertently reinforcing low levels of 
microenterprise revenue, and perhaps even relieving some of the pressure on 
governments to introduce well-devised policies for the creation of jobs.   
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Instead of conveniently treating the symptoms of informal employment, 
namely limited access to credit and a lack of opportunity, MFIs should utilize 
their close ties with the entrepreneurial population to eliminate the causes.  This 
means organizing the public to encourage governments to make the changes 
necessary to foster an environment for economic growth and productive 
employment.  It has been demonstrated in several parts of the world that MFIs 
have the potential to spur government into action, most notably in Bolivia where 
the government enacted banking reforms amidst pressure from MFIs and their 
supporters. 
In Paraguay, the prospects for entrepreneurial success are greatly impeded 
by the domestic business environment.  Major improvements in legal and 
regulatory frameworks and public services are crucial for development efforts and 
for enhancing the efficacy of microfinance.  If high poverty levels and the 
entrenched state of the informal economy are to be uprooted by meaningful 
employment and the services offered by MFIs, these changes are vital.  This is 
especially true in Paraguay, where productivity is restricted by a combination of 
corruption, an inept legal and regulatory system, and nonexistent or deficient 
public services.   
As De Soto has emphasized, sound regulatory and legal frameworks are 
essential components of successful economies.  Much of the failure of neoliberal 
prescriptions is attributable to the fact that these mechanisms were not in place in 
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the underdeveloped world (Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents).  These 
unresolved problems will continue to limit the development process by inhibiting 
the potential for microfinance.   
Within a properly functioning regulatory and legal environment, in which 
paths to formal employment are less onerous, contracts are enforceable, and 
property rights are secure and transferable, the effectiveness of microfinance 
would skyrocket.  If Paraguay were to make these improvements, the suppressed 
ingenuity and productivity of the informal sector would surface, leading to growth 
and a reduction in poverty.  The first and most important step needed to realize 
this goal is to overcome corruption.  Paraguay will never reach prosperity without 
surmounting this challenge.   
 
Final thoughts on microfinance 
Development efforts should not focus simply on increasing the size of 
economies.  Development should strive to enhance the freedoms people enjoy, as 
Sen describes.  By responsibly providing the poor with financial options, whether 
it is credit to fund a microenterprise or even a consumer loan for household items, 
this opportunity for the poor to utilize financial services, on a micro-level, is 
progress. 
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 Unquestionably, organizations such as FP and Grameen are some of the 
most innovative and effective organizations of positive social and economic 
change ever created.  However, there is much more than financial services that 
needs to be offered to the poor to provide them with the opportunity to improve 
their own lives.  Microfinance must be carefully positioned within the puzzle for 
progress; the hype that microfinance has produced cannot be allowed to siphon 
funds and attention from other, perhaps more important development projects. 
 There is no particular microfinance platform that will work best in every 
region.  Each area is unique, due to differences in things such as the labor 
environment, levels of education, and the overall national economic climate.  Due 
to this fact, the effect microfinance may have on poverty will vary across different 
locations.  In a country like Mexico, where educational attainment is relatively 
high and the economy is diverse, the types of services offered by commercial 
MFIs may be most in demand, particularly in urban areas.  In rural or poorer 
areas, or in a country similar to Paraguay, the type of microfinance that is most 
effective can be much different.  In Paraguay, opportunities for entrepreneurial 
growth are limited by the overall business climate.  There, microfinance may be 
most useful as a coping mechanism, or for consumption smoothing, rather than in 
more developed areas where it may be used more for legitimate business needs.   
Since so many microfinance clients in Paraguay operate on a very small 
scale and are unregulated and unprotected, initiatives that offer a safety net, such 
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as health insurance or pension plans, are especially needed.  Educational 
initiatives, especially in basic financial literacy, can also be very effective when 
paired with a microloan.  The group lending platform is important in Paraguay 
because it is able to reach those with lesser means, while offering lower interest 
rates and providing more of these social services than individual lending 
programs offer.  On the other hand, individual lending is also needed for its 
flexibility in the size of loans, especially for enterprises that fall somewhere 
between “micro” and medium-size, but are still too small to be serviced by 
traditional banks.   
There are few opportunities for the poor to utilize savings accounts in 
Paraguay, so commercial operations could be useful for this reason, in addition to 
increasing competition and lowering interest rates.  However, the most effective 
way for MFIs to tackle poverty in Paraguay, as in other countries, is to create a 
regulatory environment that allows non-profit MFIs to collect savings.  If MFIs 
such as FP were able to provide savings accounts, this would greatly increase 
their ability to help the poor.  In addition, with a sound regulatory environment 
that increases the types of services non-profit MFIs may provide, many of the 
problems associated with commercialization can be avoided.   
Microfinance is not going to be a panacea, but it does constitute an 
important ingredient in a recipe for progress.  Microfinance can be effective and 
can play an integral role in leading people in Paraguay and other parts of the 
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world towards better lives.  In order for it to do so most effectively, however, 
other pillars must be in place, including good governance, the availability of 
health care and education, sound infrastructure, and responsible environmental 
policy, all of which enhance the atmosphere for the creation of quality jobs.  Only 
when these measures are in place will microfinance be able to reach its full 
potential.  While this analysis has shown that microfinance cannot come close to 
bringing every one of the world’s three billion disadvantaged people out of 
poverty, it can for some.  And that is progress. 
 
The market or the state? 
Microfinance has impacted the lives and communities of over 150 million 
families across the world.  However, there are still over three billion people in the 
world living on less than $2 a day, more than a billion with no access to electricity 
and three billion without access to safe sanitation (Magner 8).  Meanwhile, 
poverty is the world’s leading cause of premature death.  These are enormous 
problems to overcome.  They can only hope to be solved with extensive 
intervention from both domestic and international actors, from both the private 
and public sectors.   
The spreading appeal of microfinance was born in an environment where 
the role of the state was diminishing, as development prospects were recast into 
the hands of private organizations and reliance on the market.  The ideology 
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behind microfinance is a direct response to the perceived failure of the state to 
effectively lead development and to improve the statistics mentioned above.  Due 
to the comparative success microfinance has achieved in targeting poverty, it may 
serve to reinforce the trend of privatizing development.  Currently, many 
initiatives undertaken to tackle penury, including primary health, education, and 
agricultural endeavors are moving out of the public and into the NGO and private 
sectors (Mosley 129).   
As the poor take their fortunes into their own hands with microcredit, it 
may be that, to a certain extent, the available fallback of self-employment, 
supported by MFIs and backed with social services, absolves the government of 
some of its responsibility to intervene to improve the lives of the poor.  This may 
be occurring in countries where government is moving away from its traditional 
redistributive role.  By pursuing intitiatives traditionally reserved for the state, 
some MFI programs may buttress this effect. 
 The role of Grameen in Bangladesh demonstrates this likelihood.  
Through several platforms, Grameen has assumed responsibilities the state has 
been unable to fulfill.  Grameen now provides (sometimes obligatory) pension 
plans and life insurance, operates village phone programs, pursues energy 
initiatives using solar panels, and provides low cost health insurance to the poor, 
which is free for the indigent. 
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While these are worthy initiatives and are of great help to the poor, the 
fact that the state has been taken out of the development process is a concern, 
especially considering that the phenomenon is spreading.  Development policy, 
once again following the trends of the time, should not entail a wholesale shift 
from state-led to privately-led efforts.  State efforts should enhance the 
effectiveness of NGOs and aid organizations, and vice versa.  A development 
approach that relies on the goodwill of private organizations, and/or the invisible 
hand of the market, is not going to be effective in the long term.   
To achieve sustainable, replicable success, strategies such as microfinance 
must be positioned to combine market means with the efforts of private 
organizations, as part of a larger national strategy that entails significant, 
responsible state involvement.  Though there will never be an elixir for poverty, 
any approach that hopes to come close will need a combination of “yesterday’s 
unexamined faith” and “the new superstition.” 
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